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RUMINATIONS ON COMPARATIVE FAULT, DUTY-
RISK ANALYSIS, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, AND
DEFENSIVE DOCTRINES IN NEGLIGENCE AND
STRICT LIABILITY LITIGATION IN LOUISIANA
David W. Robertson*
I. COMPARATIVE FAULT AND DUTY-RISK ANALYSIS:
THE (MALONE)-JOHNSON VIEW
Learning torts from Wex Malone is a process that has no end. When
I first encountered Malone in 1959 in his high-energy torts classroom,
I knew that here was a man with much to say who said it with exemplary
clarity and conviction.' Since that time, I have devoted considerable ef-
fort to the task of keeping up with Malone and his torts thinking.
Leon Green once wrote that "somehow everything in life conspires
against courage." 2 He was not thinking of Malone; no one has been less
timid than Malone about altering viewpoints to reflect changing condi-
tions and to respond to new problems. For many years, Malone cried
out against the network of tort rules whereby the victim's contributory
negligence totally barred recovery, arguing the massive superiority of the
comparative fault approach. 3 Recently, however, he is less sanguine about
the virtues of comparative fault." Malone now states that legally relevant
fault on the part of both tortfeasor and victim should not be enough
to justify quantification of the parties' fault and damages-reduction on
the basis of that quantification. Before these matters can properly be en-
trusted to triers of fact, judges must be careful to impose a control.' The
degree of fault of the parties should never be assessed until the judge
has first satisfied himself that the victim's faulty conduct did not create
Copyright 1984, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Albert Sidney Burleson Professor of Law, University of Texas.
1. Malone and torts are inseparable concepts to thousands of his once and future
students. At Louisiana State University Law School in the early 1960's, Tom Currier put
it to music and to the tune of "Sweet Molly Malone," sang: "In East Baton Rouge Parish,
with galluses garish, there once lived a man named Wex Smathers Malone." The chorus
followed: "He wondered why Rome had no Torts of her own."
2. Green, Must the Legal Profession Undergo a Spiritual Rebirth?, 16 IND. L.J. 15,
28 (1940).
3. See, e.g., Malone, Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 LA.
L. REV. 125 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Comparative Negligence]; Malone, The Formative
Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1946) [hereinafter cited as The Form-
ative Era].
4. See Malone, Symposium: Comparative Negligence in Louisiana-Prologue, 40 LA.
L. REV. 293 (1980).
5. Mistrust of juries is implicit. In his famous "Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage" arti-
cle, Malone noted the rarity of jury trials in Louisiana tort cases and stressed the virtues
of trial judges as triers of fact. Malone, Comparative Negligence, supra note 3, at 144.
Nowadays jury trials are far more frequent. Malone may never have been too happy about
supposed jury predilections. See Malone, The Formative Era, supra note 3, at 156.
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a risk that is beyond the scope of protection of the defendant's duty.
The idea is that in cases in which the judge concludes that the plaintiff's
conduct removed him from the scope of the defendant's duty, there should
be no recovery, and there is no occasion for assessing the degree of fault
of the parties.6 Malone adds that the converse of the foregoing proposi-
tion is also true: If the judge determines that the risk of the victim's fault
is "the specific reason why the defendant is burdened by law with the
particular duty whose breach is chargeable against him," 7 then once again
there is no occasion for assessing the degree of fault of the parties, because
such a defendant should be liable for the entire loss. In both types of
cases-those in which the plaintiff's faulty conduct removed him from
the scope of protection of the defendant's duty, and those in which the
plaintiff's faulty conduct is the core risk that generated the defendant's
duty-the "matter . . . can [not] be solved felicitously by merely making
an adjustment in terms of dollars and cents. Either the defendant should
be charged for the full loss, or he should not be answerable at all." 8
Malone cites Professor Alston Johnson as the principal expositor of
these proposed duty-risk limitations on comparative-fault assessment.9 In
this paper, the term "the Johnson view" is used to designate the argu-
ment that duty-risk analysis should sometimes lead the courts to conclude
either that the plaintiff's fault means he should recover nothing or that
the plaintiff's fault should not count against him at all. Several recent
comparative fault decisions have cited the Johnson view with approval."
I believe that the Johnson view is mistaken. Virtually all of the con-
siderations Johnson would relegate to judges as part of the duty-risk ques-
tion of law are properly left to triers of fact as part of their assessment
of the degree of fault of the parties.'" It will be a rare case indeed in
6. Malone, supra note 4, at 297.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Johnson, Comparative Negligence and the Duty/Risk Analysis, 40 LA. L. REV.
319 (1980). As indicated, Malone agrees with Johnson, as does Professor Chamallas. See
Chamallas, Comparative Fault and Multiple Party Litigation in Louisiana: A Sampling of
the Problems, 40 LA. L. REV. 373, 376, 377-87 (1980).
10. See Dulaney v. Travelers Ins. Co., 434 So. 2d 578, 582 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983);
Bays v. Lee, 432 So. 2d 941, 944 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); Frain v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
421 So. 2d 1169, 1172 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982). These cases are discussed infra text accom-
panying notes 130-33.
11. The central thrust of Johnson's article is regard for the virtues of duty-risk analysis
as a control of juries. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 326 n.31, 328, 332, 333 n.56, 337,
340-41; see also Frain v. State Farm Ins. Co., 421 So. 2d 1169, 1171-74 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1982). For this and other reasons, it is easier to conceptualize the problems treated
in this article by hypothesizing that the typical trial is before a jury. Article 1812(C) of
the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure sets forth the jury issues required in a comparative
fault case. Article 1917 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires a judge in a bench trial
to make specific findings of fact corresponding to the required jury issues. Hence, the analysis
is technically the same for a bench as for a jury trial.
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which the victim's fault should not diminish recovery, and an even rarer
case in which the victim's fault should remove him entirely from the scope
of protection of a duty that a defendant would have owed a similarly-
situated but fault-free victim. The Johnson view and its natural ramifica-
tions have unfortunate implications for the reasoned development of com-
parative fault principles, especially in multiparty cases and strict liability
cases.
No one should question the appropriateness of my joining this tribute
to Professor Malone with an article attacking a view he has espoused.
Reasoned disputation about tort law is perhaps Malone's favorite daytime
activity, and I look forward to his response to this paper.' 2 The title I
have chosen should itself guarantee a response. The advantage of a
"ruminations" title is probably not an important instance of the myriad
of Malone gifts to the scholarly community, but it is an entertaining
instance. 3 As I understand it, the word "ruminations" in the title of
an article permits the author to exhaust himself (and possibly his readers)
on the subject without necessarily claiming that the treatment is exhaustive.
This paper offers speculation and argument about five problems that
significantly overlap one another: (1) the proper interpretation of Loui-
siana's comparative fault legislation in multiparty cases generally; (2) the
appropriate application of duty-risk analysis in comparative fault cases;
(3) the impact of the comparative fault legislation on defendants sued
in strict liability; (4) the treatment under comparative fault of affirmative
defenses based on victim misconduct that were traditionally treated as
distinct from contributory negligence, such as assumption of risk and
misuse of a product; and (5) the analytics of distinguishing between affirm-
ative defenses and defensive doctrines. "Ruminations" serves my pur-
poses because multiparty difficulties not considered here" will undoubtedly
12. I also expect to hear from Johnson.
13. Cf. Malone, Ruminations on Liability for the Acts of Things, 42 LA. L. REV. 979
(1982); Malone, Some Ruminations on Contributory Negligence, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 91;
Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law of Torts,
31 LA. L. REV. 1 (1970); Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself System Versus
American Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. REV. 363 (1970); Malone, Ruminations on Group
Interests and the Law of Torts, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 565 (1959); Malone, Ruminations on
Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956); Malone, Ruminations on a New Tort: Angelloz
v. Humble Oil & Refining Company, 4 LA. L. REV. 309 (1942).
14. For example, how should comparative fault assessment work in a case against defen-
dant A in intentional tort and defendant B in negligence? For another example, should
the fault of the plaintiff's employer be quantified in tort cases in which the employer or
the compensation carrier intervenes to recover workers' compensation benefits? For negative
answers to that question in other comparative fault systems, see Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979); Varela v. American Petrofina Co., 658 S.W.2d
561 (Tex. 1983). The Louisiana law prior to comparative fault held that employer fault
did not affect the tort recovery. See Vidrine v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 263 La.
300, 268 So. 2d 233 (1972); W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
AND PRACTICE § 371 in 14 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 198 (1980). 1 have found no
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arise and because most of the problems discussed in this article await
judicial consideration.
II. THE "STANDARD" OPERATION OF THE
LOUISIANA COMPARATIVE FAULT STATUTES
Effective August 1, 1980, Louisiana adopted a "pure" comparative
fault system. Act 431 of 1979 amended Louisiana Civil Code articles 2103,
2323, and 2324, and articles 1811 and 1917 of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure, to effect that change.' 5 Louisiana's is a "pure" system
because a plaintiff's negligence short of 100% does not defeat but only
diminishes recovery.' 6 By contrast, "modified" systems provide that a
plaintiff is barred if his negligence exceeds 49% (in some systems) or 50%
(in most modified systems) of the total fault found.' 7 Whether Louisiana's
system is properly termed "comparative fault" rather than "comparative
negligence" is a closer question. All of the relevant Louisiana statutes
use the term "fault" when referring to tortfeasor conduct and "negligence"
when referring to victim conduct." The term "comparative fault" is used
here because it is consistent with the arguments (1) that quantification
of the parties' fault is appropriate in strict liability as well as in negligence
cases, and (2) that forms of victim misconduct other than traditional con-
tributory negligence should be quantified (in both strict liability and
negligence cases) and the resultant percentage used to diminish (but not
defeat) recovery.
In cases in which negligence is the only form of fault charged against
the alleged tortfeasors or plaintiff and there are no duty-risk
complications,' 9 the proper operation of the comparative fault statutes
is neither difficult nor controversial. The essential features of the Loui-
siana comparative fault system are: (1) The plaintiff's negligence, even
post-comparative fault Louisiana decisions, but see no reason to expect that Louisiana law
will diverge from Edmonds and Varela.
15. Article 1811 of the Code of Civil Procedure was further amended in 1983 and
renumbered as article 1812. 1983 La. Acts, No. 534, § 8. Aside from the renumbering,
the relevant changes were altering the "proximate cause" inquiry to "legal cause" and reword-
ing the provision (now article 1812(C)(2)) on quantifying the fault of tortfeasors who are
not parties to the suit. See infra notes 26, 28.
16. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2323.
17. See generally Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative Fault Laws-An
Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REV. 343 (1980).
18. Civil Code article 2103 provides for dividing solidary obligations arising from of-
fenses and quasi-offenses among the "debtors . . . in proportion to each debtor's fault."
Civil Code article 2323 speaks of plaintiff's "negligence" and defendants' "fault." Article
1812(C) of the Code of Civil Procedure uses the term "fault" when referring to parties
defendant, LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1812(C)(1), and to other tortfeasors, LA. CODE CIv. P.
art. 1812(C)(2), and the term "negligence" when referring to parties plaintiff. LA. CODE
Civ. P. art. 1812(C)(3).
19. I argue that victim-fault-avoidance doctrines such as "last clear chance" are part
of the network of duty-risk complications.-See infra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
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if 99% of the total fault found by the trier of fact, does not bar the
action but diminishes recovery by the percentage of negligence found
against the plaintiff;2" (2) solidary liability of tortfeasors obligated for
the same injuries persists, 2' but a defendant whose fault is less than the
plaintiff's owes only his percentage (as determined by his percentage of
the total fault) of plaintiff's damages;22 (3) contribution rights among
defendants are based upon the defendants' percentages of fault;23 and (4)
a tortfeasor who settles with the plaintiff continues to be insulated against
liability to the plaintiff and against claims for contribution.2 ' The nonset-
tling tortfeasor's contribution rights, defeated by the settlement, are re-
placed by his right to have the plaintiff's recovery against him diminished
in proportion to the settling tortfeasor's percentage of fault.25
The following hypothetical case2 6 demonstrates the operation of the
foregoing features of the comparative fault statutes. Assume that the plain-
tiff was injured by the combined negligence of A, B, and C. Before filing
suit, the plaintiff settled with and released C,27 and then brought a
20. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323.
21. The test for tortfeasor solidarity under the current jurisprudence is whether they
are obligated for the same thing. This test results in a broader category than traditional
"joint tortfeasors," and includes, for example, a vicariously liable employer and his tort-
feasor employee. See Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981); Foster v.
Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980). Preexisting criteria for solidarity are implicated in
the amended Civil Code article 2103. Further, amended Civil Code article 2324 provides
that persons whose concurring fault causes harm are solidarily liable, with the proviso noted
infra text accompanying note 22.
22. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2324.
23. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2103.
24. See Garrett v. Safeco Ins. Co., 433 So. 2d 209, 210 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
25. Id. at 210. This case demonstrates that the principle of Harvey v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 163 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), continues to obtain under the comparative
fault system. That principle is changed only in that the judgment in favor of a plaintiff
who has settled with one of several tortfeasors is now reduced according to the settling
tortfeasor's percentage of fault rather than, as formerly, his virile share.
26. In all of the examples used in this paper, the parties are presumed to have properly
asserted and protected their rights. Hence, the example in the text assumes that the plain-
tiff, when settling with and releasing C, properly reserved his rights against the other tort-
feasors. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2203. The example also assumes that defendants A and
B properly pleaded the plaintiff's negligence, their contribution rights against each other,
and their right to have any judgment against them reduced to reflect the plaintiff's settle-
ment with C.
Under article 1812(C) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the fault of any actor must be
a "legal cause" of the damages in order to be considered. Act 534 of 1983 replaced "prox-
imate cause" with "legal cause." Defining "legal cause" to a jury is beyond the scope
of this article, but probably conduct is a legal cause of injury if it is a substantial factor
in bringing it about. The examples used in this paper assume that the trier of fact will
conclude that the faulty conduct of each party found guilty of fault was a legal cause of
the plaintiff's injuries.
27. The amount of the settlement with C is irrelevant to determining the liabilities of
the other tortfeasors.
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negligence action against A and B. The trier of fact found as follows:





On those findings, the plaintiff should recover $60,000, of which A should
ultimately bear $40,000 and B, $20,000. The plaintiff's potential recovery
of $100,000 is diminished by his own percentage of negligence (30%)29
and the percentage of fault found against C, the settling tortfeasor (10%).10
A's and B's ultimate shares of the $60,000 liability are determined by
their percentages of fault." The judgment should provide that A and B
are solidarily liable to plaintiff for $20,000 and that A is individually liable
for an additional $40,000.32 It should also provide that A is entitled to
contribution from B up to a ceiling of $20,000 should more than $40,000
be collected from A. 33
28. All of these findings are procedurally proper. Article 1812(C)(4) of the Code of
Civil Procedure provides for the damages finding. Article 1812(C)(3) provides for finding
the percentage of the plaintiff's negligence. Article 1812(C)(1) provides for finding the defen-
dants' percentages of fault. Article 1812(C)(2) provides for finding the percentage of fault
of "another person"-i.e., other than plaintiff(s) and defendant(s)-"whether party or not,"
"if appropriate." In its pre-1983 amendment state, this subsection, then numbered as arti-
cle 181 1(B)(2), used the term "another involved person," and omitted the language "whether
party or not." I do not think that Act 534 of 1983 changed or clarified anything. Commen-
tators agree that article 1812(C)(2) is intended to provide for quantifying the fault of a
settling tortfeasor who is never made a party to the litigation. See Wade, Comparative
Negligence-Its Development in the United States and Its Present Status in Louisiana, 40
LA. L. REV. 299, 312 & n.61 (1980); Chamallas, supra note 9, at 393-94. One court of
appeal has so held. Garrett v. Safeco Ins. Co., 433 So. 2d 209, 210 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
Probably article 1812(C)(2) should be limited in its application to the nonparty settling
tortfeasor situation. Unless the nonparty's fault is imputable to or otherwise chargeable
against one or more of the parties to the lawsuit, a percentage fault finding as to a non-
party other than a settling tortfeasor can only produce confusion. However, one case holds
that 1812(c)(2) mandates quantifying the fault of an absent and unknown tortfeasor. Varnado
v. Continental Ins. Co., 446 So. 2d 1343, 1345 (La. App. 1st Cit. 1984). The commentators
are not in agreement on this point. See Chamallas, supra note 9, at 398, 393-94 (the Loui-
siana legislation requires quantifying nonparty fault and such quantification is a good idea);
Pearson, supra note 17, at 354 & n.49 (quantifying nonparty fault should be avoided, but
the Louisiana legislation seems to require it); Wade, supra, at 311 (appearing to agree with
this writer). Section 2(a)(2) of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 12 U.L.A. 39 (Supp.
1979), reprinted in 40 LA. L. REV. 419, 425 (1980), expressly provides for quantification
of the fault of parties and nonparty settling tortfeasors only.
29. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323.
30. See Garrett v. Safeco Ins. Co., 433 So. 2d 209, 210 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
31. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2103.
32. Under Civil Code article 2324, A and B ate solidarily liable, but B, whose negligence
was less than the plaintiff's, cannot be held for more than his percentage share of the loss.
33. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2103.
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1II. AN EXAMPLE OF MULTIPARTY LITIGATION
COMPLICATED BY STRICT LIABILITY AND DUTY-RISK ISSUES
The proper operation of comparative fault principles in the
hypothetical case discussed in Part II is not controversial because that
example involved no duty-risk complications and negligence was the only
form of fault asserted against any of the actors. A hypothetical case com-
bining allegations of negligence and other fault and including represen-
tative duty-risk issues would involve greater complications. Assume that
the plaintiff was a pedestrian. Before stepping into the path of the
automobile that struck him, he was warned by a friend that the oncom-
ing automobile was dangerously near, and responded, "Let him look out
for me." 3 4 The plaintiff was struck and injured by the automobile and
sought redress. The potential defendants were A, who manufactured the
automobile which was defective by reason of faulty brakes; B, the driver,
who was negligently exceeding the speed limit while failing to keep a pro-
per lookout; and C, who owned the automobile and negligently loaned
it to B. Before filing suit, the plaintiff settled with and released C? The
plaintiff then sued A in strict products liability asserting no negligence,
and B in negligence.
The issues suggested by this hypothetical case are best identified by
assuming the case is tried to a jury ' and by particularizing the pleadings
and evidence as follows:
(1) Plaintiff's case in chief against A, the manufacturer:
(a) The petition asserts A's strict liability for promulgating
a car with defective brakes. Negligence is not pleaded.
(b) The evidence supports submission of the elements of the
strict liability case to the jury."
(2) Plaintiff's case in chief against B, the driver:
34. This fact raises an assumption of risk issue. But cf. Dofflemyer v. Gilley, 384 So.
2d 435 (La. 1980) (reversing an assumption of risk verdict for defendant on very similar
facts). This article treats the issue of the continued validity of affirmative defenses such
as assumption of risk as part of the network of duty-risk complications. I do not believe
that Malone or Johnson would argue for retention of assumed risk as a bar to recovery.
But cf. Johnson, supra note 9, at 332 & n.48, 336 n.65. However, as explained infra at
notes 161-67, 184-86 and accompanying text, applying duty-risk reasoning to issues of vic-
tim fault has the potential of perpetuating defenses such as assumed risk.
35. See supra notes 26-27.
36. See supra note 11.
37. The elements of a strict products liability case in Louisiana are: (1) the product
was defective, i.e., unreasonably dangerous in normal use; (2) the product was in normal
use at the time of the injury; and (3) the injuries were caused by the defect. See, e.g.,
Khoder v. AMF, Inc., 539 F.2d 1078, 1079 (5th Cir. 1976); Oatis v. Catalytic, Inc., 433
So. 2d 328, 332 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Harris v. Atlanta Store Works, 428 So. 2d 1040,
1042 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 So. 2d 1106 (La. 1983).
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(a) The petition asserts the elements of a case in negligence
against B for exceeding a safe speed and failing to maintain
a proper lookout.
(b) The evidence warrants submitting the negligence issues to
the jury.
(3) Affirmative defenses raised by A and B:
(a) Each answer pleads assumption of risk38 and contributory
negligence. 39
(b) The evidence shows that the plaintiff's only fault was step-
ping into the path of the oncoming car in the face of his
friend's warning, and warrants submission of the issue of
plaintiff's fault to the jury.
(4) Defendant's contribution claims:
(a) A and B each plead that the fault of the other is wholly
or partially responsibile for the plaintiff's injuries, and that
they are consequently entitled to indemnity or in the alter-
native contribution against each other.4 0
(b) As indicated above, jury issues are presented as to the fault
of each defendant.
(5) Defendant's claims to judgment-reduction to reflect plaintiff's
settlement with C:
4 1
(a) A and B plead that C knew or should have known that
the car's brakes were faulty and was consequently guilty of
negligence such that he would have been wholly or in the alter-
native partially responsible for plaintiff's injuries. They further
plead that any recovery by plaintiff must be diminished by
the degree of fault of which C was guilty.
(b) The evidence supports submitting the negligence issues as
against C to the jury.4 2
The issues that must be resolved by the trial judge before he can decide
how to submit the foregoing case to the jury represent the range of prob-
38. See supra note 34.
39. Under one view, "comparative negligence" is just one form of "contributory
negligence." See Johnson, supra note 9, at 325, n.30. In any event, pleading "contributory
negligence" should suffice to raise the comparative negligence issue. See Crawford, Com-
parative Negligence, Strict Liability and Pleading Problems in Louisiana Tort Law, Seminar
on Torts, Comparative Negligence and Products Liability (Center of Continuing Prof. Dev.
Oct. 21-22, 1983).
40. For discussion of the Louisiana tort law on indemnity, see infra text accompanying
notes 212-29.
41. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text & note 28.
42. For an explanation of why it is proper to secure a fault finding as to a settling
nonparty tortfeasor, see supra note 28.
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lems that, if not properly resolved, promise to retard the reasoned develop-
ment of comparative fault principles. Those issues are the following:
(1) In the action against A, the strict liability defendant, does
any "negligence" of which plaintiff may be found guilty operate
to bar or to diminish his recovery? What is the proper role of
victim negligence in a strict liability case?
(2) Should the fault of A, the strict liability defendant, be
quantified:
(a) For purposes of determining A's liability to plaintiff?
(b) For purposes of determining contribution rights between A
(the strict liability defendant) and B (the negligence
defendant)?
(c) For purposes of giving the appropriate effect to the settle-
ment between plaintiff and C (the nonparty tortfeasor)?
(3) In the action against B, the negligent motorist, does any fault
of which plaintiff may be found guilty operate to diminish his
recovery? Or is such negligence to be forgiven under the duty-
risk analysis set forth in the Baumgartner case?43
(4) In the actions against each defendant, does any "assumption
of risk" of which the plaintiff may be found guilty operate to
bar recovery? To diminish recovery?
(5) Is either defendant entitled to indemnity from the other? From
C, the settling tortfeasor? Is either defendant entitled to reduce
the plaintiff's judgment to zero because of a right of indemnity
against C that was defeated by plaintiff's settlement with C?
These issues will be discussed in the sections that follow.
IV. APPLICATION OF COMPARATIVE FAULT PRINCIPLES
To CASES OF STRICT LIABILITY
A. Louisiana's Strict Liability Doctrines
In Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp.," the Louisiana Supreme Court
articulated a broad civilian approach to strict liability questions.", I believe
the court intended Langlois as a basis for the development of general
principles of strict liability along non-doctrinal lines, and that the fun-
43. Baumgartner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 356 So. 2d 400 (La. 1978), held
that a negligent pedestrian is not barred from recovering from a negligent motorist, reason-
ing that the motorist's duty should be construed to embrace the risk of negligence by
pedestrians. In its initial and most obvious application, Baumgartner was a hedge against
the perceived harshness of contributory negligence operating as a complete bar to recovery.
Professor Johnson, however, strongly contends that the Baumgartner principle should have
continuing vitality in the comparative fault system. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 330-32.
44. 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
45. 258 La. at 1071-78, 1086-88, 249 So. 2d at 136-37, 140.
1984] 1349
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damental idea of the decision is inconsistent with the existence of distinct
legally-recognized categories of conduct giving rise to strict liability. Be
that as it may, such categories have developed. First, Langlois has come
to stand for strict liability for ultrahazardous activities. 6 Second, what
is now regarded as a separate category of strict liability applies against
the manufacturer of a defective product.4 '7 A third category of strict liability
is currently termed "relational responsibility," 8 embracing Louisiana Civil
Code articles 2317 (things),"9 2318 (children),5" 2321 (animals),5 ' and 2322
(buildings).2
B. Is "Contributory Negligence" an Available Defense in Strict
Liability Cases?
Presently, the jurisprudence contains only hints as to whether a plain-
tiff's negligence will be quantified to diminish recovery in strict liability
cases arising after August 1, 1980, the effective date of the comparative
46. Ultrahazardous activities are currently defined as those producing situations "where
the risk is such that the harm results from the very nature of the activity itself, irrespective
of protective measures taken by the enterpriser." Hebert v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 426
So. 2d 111, 114 n.6 (La. 1983). See also O'Neal v. International Paper Co., 715 F.2d 199,
201-02 (5th Cir. 1983); CNG Producing Co. v. Columbia Gulf Transmission, 709 F.2d 959,
961-62 (5th Cir. 1983); Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 199 (E.D. La.
1983); Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 498 (La. 1982); Smith v. Formica
Corp., 439 So. 2d 1194, 1200 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Deville v. Calcasieu Parish Gravity
Drainage Dist. # 5, 422 So. 2d 631, 635 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Dunson v. Triad Chem.
Co., 360 So. 2d 223, 224-25 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978): The traditional examples are pile
driving, storage of toxic gas, blasting with explosives, and crop dusting with airplanes. Ac-
tivities which have been excluded from the operation of this theory include venting of natural
gas, see CNG Producing Co., 709 F.2d 959, and transmitting electricity over high tension
lines. See Hebert, 426 So. 2d 11; Kent, 418 So. 2d 439. The courts have taken to calling
this variant of strict liability "absolute liability." See Hebert, Kent, Smith, 439 So. 2d 1194;
Deville, 422 So. 2d 631.
47. The leading case is Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 259 La. 569, 250 So.
2d 754 (1971). See generally Robertson, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Products
in Louisiana Law, 50 TUL. L. REV. 50 (1975).
48. See, e.g., Note, Contributing Negligence- When should It Be a Defense in a Strict
Liability Action?, 43 LA. L. REv. 801, 804 (1983); Note, Victim Fault: Who Are You Really
and What Were You Before?, 42 LA. L. REV. 1393 (1982); Note, A Functional Purpose
for Comparing Faults: A Suggestion for Reexamining "Strict Liability," 41 LA. L. REV.
1374 (1981).
49. The leading case is Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975). Wex Malone
believes this strict liability doctrine is a bad idea. See Malone, Ruminations on Liability
for the Acts of Things, 42 LA. L. REV. 979 (1982). Professor Bill Crawford believes Kent
v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982), effectively overruled Loescher. See
Crawford, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Torts, 43 LA. L. REV. 607 (1982). However,
Crawford has recently pointed out that the subsequent decision in Entrevia v. Hood, 427
So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983), backs away from Kent and rehabilitates Loescher. Crawford,
Developments in the Law, 1982-83-Torts, 44 LA. L. REV. 579, 579-80 (1983).
50. The leading case is Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975).
51. The leading case is Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974). See also Rozell
v. Louisiana Animal Breeders Coop., 434 So. 2d 404 (La. 1983).
52. The leading case is probably Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1979).
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fault statutes. 3 Hence, an examination of the pre-comparative fault
jurisprudence for characterizations of victim fault is relevant. In the more
recent decisions, courts have often confronted the issue whether a plain-
tiff's contributory negligence bars recovery in strict liability actions. For
ultrahazardous activity liability, the answer was clearly no., 4 As to strict
products liability, the jurisprudence was divided, with a preponderance
of the cases answering no." In relational responsibility cases, there was
also a split in the jurisprudence, with the numerical weight favoring an
affirmative answer.56
53. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
54. See Dorry v. LaFleur, 399 So. 2d 559, 560 (La. 1981); Langlois v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 258 La. 1067, 1086, 249 So. 2d 133, 140 (1971); Gordon v. City of New Orleans,
430 So. 2d 234, 236 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); Buchanan v. Tangipahoa Parish Police Jury,
426 So. 2d 720, 724 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Falgout v. Wardlaw, 423 So. 2d 707, 709
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
55. Cases holding or stating in dictum that contributory negligence does not bar recovery
in strict product liability cases include CNG Producing Co. v. Columbia Gulf Transmis-
sion, 709 F.2d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 1983); LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623
F.2d 985, 991 (5th Cir. 1980); Khoder v. AMF, Inc., 539 F.2d 1078, 1081 (5th Cir. 1976);
Coburn v. Browning Arms Co., 565 F. Supp. 742, 745-50 (W.D. La. 1983); Harris v. Atlanta
Stove Works, 428 So. 2d 1040, 1043-44 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 So. 2d 1106
(La. 1983) (court shows some doubt); Buchanan v. Tangipahoa Parish Police Jury, 426
So. 2d 720, 727 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Falgout v. Wardlaw, 423 So. 2d 707, 709 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1982); Dixon v. Gutnecht, 339 So. 2d 1285, 1289-90 (La. App. 1st Cir.. 1976),
writ denied, 342 So. 2d 673 (La. 1977).
Cases suggesting that contributory negligence may be a bar to recovery in products liability
cases include Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 358 So. 2d 926, 930 (La. 1978); Oatis
v. Catalytic, Inc., 433 So. 2d 328, 332 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Lovell v. Earl Grissmer
Co., 422 So. 2d 1344, 1352 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 871 (La. 1983).
Cases suggesting that the effect of contributory negligence in product liability cases is
an open question include Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 717 F. 2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1983) (en
banc) (certification of question to Louisiana Supreme Court); Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716
F.2d 1425, 1431-32 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Tri-State Ins. Co. y. Fidelity & Casualty
Ins. Co., 364 So. 2d 657, 660-61 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 365 So. 2d 248 (La.
1978); Avoyelles Country Club v. Walter Kidde & Co., 338 So. 2d 379, 383 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1976).
56. Cases holding or stating in dictum that contributory negligence may bar recovery
in relational responsibility cases include Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 717 F.2d 181, 182 (5th
Cir. 1983) (en banc); CNG Producing Co. v. Columbia Gulf Transmission, 709 F.2d 959,
962 (5th Cir. 1983); Hyde v. Chevron USA, 697 F.2d 614, 622-29 (5th Cir. 1983); Oliver
v. Aminoil USA, 662 F.2d 349, 352 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982);
Moczygemba v. Danos & Curole Marine Contractors, 561 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 (5th Cir. 1977);
Coburn v. Browning Arms Co., 564 F. Supp. 742, 745-50 (W.D. La. 1983); Dorry v. LaFleur,
399 So. 2d 559, 560-62 (La. 1981); Valenti v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 435 So.
2d 1088, 1092 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Gordon v. City of New Orleans, 430 So. 2d 234,
235-36 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); Buchanan v. Tangipahoa Parish Police Jury, 426 So. 2d
720, 724-26 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Falgout v. Wardlaw, 423 So. 2d 707, 709-10 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1982); Lovell v. Earl Grissmer Co., 422 So. 2d 1344, 1352 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 871 (La. 1983); Carpenter v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co., 411 So. 2d 1206, 1210 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
Cases suggesting that contributory negligence is not an available defense in relational
responsibility cases include Alford v. Pool Offshore Co., 661 F.2d 43, 45 (5th Cir. 1981);
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C. Should Plaintiff's Negligence Reduce Recovery in Strict Liability Cases
Arising Under Comparative Fault?
Because Civil Code article 2323 states that a plaintiff's negligence shall
be quantified and reduce recovery "[wihen contributory negligence is ap-
plicable to a claim for damages," the pre-comparative fault jurisprudence
on the relevance of contributory negligence in strict liability cases is ob-
viously significant on the question of how a plaintiff's negligence should
be treated in strict liability cases decided under the comparative fault
legislation. However, the predecessor jurisprudence should not be con-
trolling. Article 2323 neither states nor should be taken to mean that the
issue of the applicability of contributory negligence in strict liability cases
is frozen according to the weight of the pre-comparative fault cases."
Several decisions have suggested that plaintiff negligence should and
probably will be quantified to reduce recovery in strict products liability
and/or relational responsibility cases decided under the comparative fault
statutes. 8 Obviously, the legislature has in fact left this determination to
the courts. In Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast," the Fifth Circuit, en banc, has
certified the following question to the Louisiana Supreme Court: "Does
the Louisiana Civil Code permit the defense known as contributory
negligence to be advanced to defeat or mitigate a claim of strict liability
based upon a defective product, the theory of liability commonly known
as 'product liability'?" The supreme court has not yet indicated whether
Rodrigue v. Dixilyn Corp., 620 F.2d 537, 542-44 (5th Cir. 1980); Payne v. Louisiana Dep't
of Transp. & Dev., 424 So. 2d 324, 329 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982); Verrett v. Cameron
Tel. Co., 417 So. 2d 1319, 1326-27 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
Cases treating the question as unsettled include Deville v. Calcasieu Parish Gravity Drainage
Dist. # 5, 422 So. 2d 631, 635 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Sumner v. Foremost Ins. Co.,
417 So. 2d 1327, 1333-34 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982). In Guillot v. Fisherman's Paradise,
Inc., 437 So. 2d 840 (La. 1983), both lower courts held that contributory negligence does
bar recovery in relational responsibility cases; the supreme court did not reach the issue.
57. Professor Johnson perhaps disagrees. While he believes that the quoted portion
of Civil Code article 2323 leaves the courts free to use duty-risk analysis to determine on
a case-by-case basis whether victim negligence should be quantified, Johnson, supra note
9, at 338, and that this duty-risk analysis is applicable to strict liability cases, (id. at 332,
336 n.66), he also states that the 1979 legislature probably meant to exclude strict liability
cases from the operation of article 2323. Id. at 339 n.70.
58. See Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1431-32 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Hyde
v. Chevron USA, 697 F.2d 614, 628-29 (5th Cir. 1983); Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co.,
418 So. 2d 493, 500 n.10, 502 n.1 (La. 1982); Buchanan v. Tangipahoa Parish Police Jury,
426 So. 2d 720, 726-27 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Lovell v. Earl Grissmer Co., 422 So.
2d 1344, 1352 n.4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 871 (La. 1983); Verrett
v. Cameron Tel. Co., 417 So. 2d 1319, 1323 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); cf. Rodrigue v.
Dixilyn Corp., 620 F.2d 537, 544 n.ll (5th Cir. 1980). In Abraham v. Hanover Ins. Co.,
420 So. 2d 526 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982), a premises hazard case that might well have been
tried under Civil Code article 2317 was evidently pursued as a negligence action, and the
court of appeal upheld the trier-of-fact's assessment of the plaintiff's negligence at 1010.
59. 717 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
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it will accept the certification."0 Because the facts of Bell occurred before
the effective date of the comparative fault legislation,6 1 the case may not
be a suitable one to answer the comparative fault inquiry. However, if
the supreme court accepts the certification, this writer believes the court
should and will answer that "contributory negligence" mitigates strict pro-
duct liability claims arising after August 1, 1980, according to the prin-
ciples of comparative fault.
If the supreme court answers the certified question as suggested, its
answer will almost certainly control relational responsibility cases as well
as products liability cases, whether or not the court specifically addresses
relational responsibility.6 2 On the other hand, the effect of a plaintiff's
negligence in ultrahazardous activity cases will not be resolved until the
supreme court directly addresses that issue, because the considerations sup-
porting ultrahazardous activity strict liability have been viewed by the
courts as significantly different from other strict liability theories.6 3 The
better view would treat plaintiff negligence alike in all strict liability cases.
However, the ultrahazardous activity category is rather narrowly confined
under the present law," and the number of cases involving the issue cor-
respondingly smaller than under the other two theories. For these reasons,
the remainder of this discussion will focus on products liability and rela-
tional responsibility cases.
At least six arguments 65 support treating plaintiff negligence as a
percentage reduction of recovery in products liability" and relational
60. Telephone conversations with Wayne H. Carlton, Jr. and Donald 0. Collins, counsel
in Bell (Feb. 13, 1984).
61. Id.
62. The policy and doctrinal arguments for excluding relational responsibility cases from
the application of the comparative fault statutes are considerably weaker than the arguments
for excluding products liability cases.
63. Ultrahazardous activity liability is currently being termed "absolute" as a way of
signalling these differences. See supra note 46.
64. See supra note 46.
65. Lawyer/economists are currently debating these matters on a somewhat different
level. Judge Higginbotham's opinion for the en banc court in Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716
F.2d 1425, 1432-33 (5th Cir. 1983), argued that a comparative fault defense in strict pro-
ducts liability law is economically more efficient than the absence of any victim-fault defense.
The argument is that the absence of a victim-fault defense charges manufacturers with costs,
and induces safety expenditures, that should properly be charged to the negligent user. Some
lawyer/economists make a similar argument for the economic superiority-'"allocative effi-
ciency" superiority-of contributory negligence as opposed to comparative negligence. See,
e.g., Landis & Posner, The Positive Economic Thedry of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851,
919 (1981); Landis & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 537-39 (1980). The assumptions involved in these arguments include
perfect rationality of all relevant actors (including perfect foresight as to the future behavior
of other relevant actors) and the absence of any litigation costs.
66. The countervailing argument, that diminishing the products liability plaintiff's recovery
in the amount of his negligence offends the basic premises of strict products liability, is
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responsibility strict liability cases. (1) Any other resolution disagreeably
complicates multiple-defendant cases. 7 (2) It is anomalous to treat negligent
defendants more favorably than strict liability defendants. (3) It is fairer
as between the plaintiff and the strict liability defendant to take the plain-
tiff's fault into account. (4) To the extent that tort law deters accident-
productive behavior, an arguable deterrent effect is built into the reduc-
tion of the plaintiff's recovery on the basis of his own fault. Even if
one believes it unlikely that tort law has any real deterrence function,
the symbolism of wholly forgiving substandard conduct is unhealthy. (5)
To the extent that refusal to take plaintiff fault into account yields large
recoveries against strictly liable defendants in favor of negligent plain-
tiffs, the strict liability theories themselves are brought into disrepute, and
a considerable incentive is created for the courts or legislature to abolish
or curtail the operation of those doctrines."' (6) The absence of a
percentage-reduction defense based on contributory negligence invites the
courts to treat serious victim misconduct in the guise of duty-risk limita-
tions or other defensive doctrines or affirmative defenses so as to bar
recovery altogether."9 As will be detailed hereinafter, the first argument
alone should carry the day. Unless comparative fault works across the
board, multiparty litigation can become well-nigh impossible to administer.
D. Should the Fault of a Strict Liability Defendant Be Quantified?
Concluding that a plaintiff's negligence should be quantified to
diminish recovery in strict liability cases would not necessarily entail con-
cluding that a strict liability defendant's fault should also be quantified.
In a pure strict liability case involving only one tortfeasor, overtly quan-
tifying the defendant's fault will be unnecessary; simply assigning a
negligence percentage to the plaintiff will permit resolution of such a case.7"
But when more than one tortfeasor is involved, solidary liability ques-
tions must be decided and contribution rights have to be worked out,
well stated by Judge Politz in the panel opinion in Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 697 F.2d 1252
(5th Cir. 1983), and in his dissent from the en banc reversal, 716 F.2d at 1433 (5th Cir.
1983) (en banc). Lewis involved the question of the availability of a comparative negligence
reduction in maritime products liability litigation, but the policies involved are the same
as under Louisiana law.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 230-66.
68. The wisdom of some of Louisiana's strict liability theories is being furiously debated.
See, e.g., Malone, supra note 49. But each of the theories has a genesis and justification
independent of the issue of the proper effect of plaintiff misconduct in actions under the
theory, and each should be judged on the basis of the justifications for imposing non-
negligence liability upon defendants, not upon the issue of the available affirmative defenses.
69. See infra notes 161-67, 184-86, 189-211 and accompanying text.
70. If the plaintiff sues a single defendant in products liability, and the facts establish
$100,000 in damages, the defendant's liability, and the plaintiff's negligence at 25%, the
plaintiff should recover $75,000. For the trier of fact to conclude specifically that the defen-
dant's fault constituted the other 75% would be unnecessary.
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and it will often be necessary to decide whether the fault of strict liability
defendants can be quantified for purposes of comparison with other strict
liability defendants, negligent defendants, and/or negligent plaintiffs.
The comparative fault statutes appear to require the quantification
of strict liability fault in multiple tortfeasor cases. Civil Code article 2103
states that a solidary obligation arising from an offense or a quasi-offense
"shall be divided in proportion to each debtor's fault." By its terms,
this provision clearly applies to strict liability tort defendants." Civil Code
article 2324 states that persons whose concurring fault causes damages
are solidarily liable, but that a defendant whose fault is less than that
of the plaintiff is not liable beyond his percentage share of the damages.
This provision, too, applies by its terms to strict liability defendants.
Courts and commentators around the country have sometimes con-
tended that assigning a percentage to the fault of a strictly liable tort-
feasor, who by hypothesis is guilty of no negligence, is a conceptual
impossibility." Ultimately these arguments are unpersuasive. The commen-
tary accompanying the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (Uniform Act) 3
includes a persuasive discussion of methods for quantifying fault, sug-
gesting that there is no insuperable difficulty with assessing the percen-
tage of fault of a strictly liable defendant and comparing that fault with
the negligence of the plaintiff or another defendant. Circumstances that
should be considered in assessing the fault of any party include: (1) whether
the actor's conduct was mere inadvertence or involved an awareness of
the danger; (2) the magnitude of the risk created by the conduct, including
the number of persons endangered and the seriousness of the injuries
threatened; (3) the importance of what the actor was trying to accomplish
by his conduct; (4) the actor's superior or inferior capacities; (5) the par-
ticular circumstances of the events in suit, such as the existence of an
emergency; (6) the policy behind the rule or rules of law violated by the
actor's conduct; and (7) the relative closeness of the causal relationship
of the actor's conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.7" The considerations
suggested by the commentary to the Uniform Act provide an acceptable
basis for assigning a percentage to the fault of the automobile manufac-
71. See Chamallas, supra note 9, at 375. Under the current jurisprudence, multiple
defendants are solidarily liable if obligated to the same damages. See supra note 21. Fur-
ther, solidarity has been expanded by amended Civil Code article 2324.
72. For a discussion of authorities arguing such, see Pearson, supra note 17, at 345-49;
Plant, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 40 LA. L. REV. 403, 406-10 (1980).
See also Wade, supra note 28, at 314-15.
73. 12 U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 1979), reprinted in 40 LA. L. REV. 419 (1980).
74. 2 commissioners' comment id. at 39-41 reprinted in 40 LA. L. REV. at 426-27.
Much ink has been spilled over whether comparative fault assessment involves comparing
blameworthiness or closeness of causal connection or both. See generally Pearson, supra




turer in the hypothetical case set forth in Part III." Fault is never assessed
or compared in a vacuum; the causal contribution and blameworthiness
of all of the parties to a tortious event provide a basis for assessment
and comparison. If the facts surrounding the conduct of the parties do
not provide an emotionally satisfying basis for arriving at a percentage,
the trier of fact is free to assess fault equally as among the causally con-
tributing parties. Ultimately, the argument is that any reasonable appor-
tionment is "far superior to that ultimate crudity-the all-or-nothing
position." 76
Most of the commentators and courts considering the problem have
concluded that, somehow or other, the fault of a strictly liable defendant
can be quantified and compared with the negligence or other fault of
other parties to the litigation." Hence, the clearest answer to the argu-
ment that strict liability fault cannot be quantified is probably similar
to the one given by the religious skeptic who, when asked if he believes
in infant baptism, responds: "Believe in it? Hell, I've seen it done!"
V. APPLICATION OF DUTY-RISK REASONING IN COMPARATIVE FAULT CASES
In general terms the duty-risk approach that came into Louisiana tort
law via the Dixie Drive It Yourself decision" and its progeny" is easy
to describe: It supplanted and replaced the "proximate cause" grab bag
of defensive theories. Rather than asking whether the defendant's con-
duct was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, the duty-risk ap-
proach has courts asking whether the plaintiff's injuries were within the
scope of protection of a duty owed by the defendant. ° That simple shift
in vocabulary and analysis has profound consequences: It might be called
a small revolution in torts thinking.8
75. With specific reference to products liability defendants, the commissioners' com-
ment to § 2 of the Uniform Act states:
[Ain automobile manufacturer putting out a car with a cracked brake cylinder
may, even in the absence of proof of negligence in failing to discover the crack,
properly be held to a greater measure of fault than another manufacturer produc-
ing a mechanical pencil with a defective clasp that due care would have discovered.
12 U.LA. 40 (Supp. 1979), reprinted in 40 LA. L. REV. at 426-27.
76. Wade, supra note 28, at 314.
77. See Plant, supra note 72, at 406-10; Pearson, supra note 17, at 345-49, and authorities
cited threin; see also Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1427-32 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
78. Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d
298 (1962).
79. See generally Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself System Versus
American Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. REV. 363 (1970); Robertson, Reason Versus Rule
in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues on Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 34 LA. L. REV.
1 (1973).
80. The ease of translating proximate cause articulations into duty-risk articulations
is discussed in Robertson, supra note 79, and is illustrated by Judge Tate's opinion in Dartez
v. City of Sulphur, 179 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
81. See authorites cited supra note 79.
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The shift from proximate cause to duty-risk was not centrally
motivated or fueled by judicial concern over victim-fault issues. 2 While
it had not been unusual for courts to intermingle proximate cause and
victim-fault issues,83 in most such cases victim fault was clearly enough
the "real reason" for nonliability. The uses of proximate cause to limit
liability in cases unaffected by the victim-fault defenses was the principal
target of the shift to duty-risk.
Once duty-risk reasoning was established, however, it soon commended
itself to courts as relevant to victim-fault problems. In some cases in which
victim fault barred recovery, courts articulated that conclusion in duty-
risk terms: the victim's conduct took him outside the scope of protection
of the defendant's duty. 4 Much more frequently and much more impor-
tantly, courts concerned to avoid barring a negligent victim began to use
duty-risk reasoning as a way around the victim-fault problem. The
hypothetical case set forth in Part III raised both sorts of duty-risk
possibilities. One issue was whether the duty-risk reasoning exemplified
by Baumgartner v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.8" should continue
to apply to forgive the negligence of a pedestrian in a suit against a
negligent motorist. Another was whether conduct constituting assumption
of risk should bar a plaintiff's recovery in either the negligence or the
strict liability action or both.87
The Johnson view is that duty-risk reasoning should continue to be
applied to victim-fault problems arising in comparative fault cases,
sometimes as a way of stating that victim fault totally bars recovery and
sometimes as a way of stating that victim fault is wholly forgiven. This
section of this article argues against that view.
As a preliminary to addressing the wisdom of these duty-risk ap-
proaches to victim fault in comparative fault cases, 88 the Johnson view
82. Cf. Johnson, supra note 9, at 328.
83. For articulations that the plaintiff's fault was the "sole proximate cause" of the
injuries, see Lemelle v. State, 435 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Ford v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 434 So. 2d 559, 562 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
84. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 334-37.
85. See infra notes 110-22 and accompanying text.
86. 356 So. 2d 400 (La. 1978).
87. See supra note 34.
88. Preliminarily to the preliminary, two analytical points that Johnson, probably cor-
rectly, does not consider important to his thesis should be isolated and set aside. First,
broadly speaking, the issue Johnson addresses is whether victim-fault issues should almost
always be handled according to jury quantification of the fault of the parties, or whether
many victim-fault issues should be handled by judges under the duty-risk analysis. In treating
the methods whereby he believes judges should often handle these matters, i.e., the duty-
risk principles, Johnson frequently lumps the scope of duty issue with the breach of duty
issue. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 322, 330, 335, 339 & nn.71-72. (Johnson's text and
note 71 make the scope/breach distinction; note 72 and accompanying text ignore it). However,
breach of duty is traditionally a jury issue. In Louisiana, appellate review of facts means
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needs elaboration. The following seems to be a fair summary: Contributory
negligence originated and for many years served as an important means
of controlling juries." It also served as a means of appellate control of
trial courts." These controls should not be abandoned.' The duty-risk
analysis, which has already emerged as an important jury-control device
in its own right,9" should encompass the victim-fault issue so that the
judicial control formerly provided by contributory negligence is retained.
Duty-risk is a flexible93 and sophisticated9 ' approach to retention of such
control by judges. In cases in which the defendant's conduct is greatly
more undesirable than the plaintiff's conduct, fairness and/or important
legal policies may well demand that the plaintiff's fault not reduce his
recovery." Conversely, if the plaintiff's conduct is greatly more undesirable
than the defendant's, the same considerations should lead to the conclu-
sion that the defendant is not liable at all.9 These questions are too im-
portant to be left to juries. 97 Juries are doubtful fact-finders, of limited
wisdom and subject to prejudice." Furthermore, the process of quantify-
ing fault in even those cases in which it should be done probably cannot
be accomplished with any acceptable degree of rationality, and the better
approach in those cases may well be equal or pro rata division of
the distinction between judge issues and jury issues is hard to keep straight and often does
not particularly need to be kept straight. Still, it will aid understanding of the Johnson
view and my criticisms of the view to point out that, as used by Johnson and in this article,
"duty-risk reasoning" includes any judge-made determination that victim fault should not
be quantified, either because it should not count against plaintiff at all or because it entirely
defeats the plaintiff. Secondly, victim fault is traditionally treated as an affirmative defense,
whereas the want of any duty owed by the defendant is a defensive doctrine, i.e., a nega-
tion of one of the elements of the plaintiff's case in chief. For a discussion of the distinc-
tion between affirmative defenses and defensive doctrines, see infra text accompanying notes
70-77. The defendant has the burden of proof of affirmative defense issues, whereas the
plaintiff has it on the existence of each element of the case in chief. Johnson states that
the burden of proof point is unimportant because in practice defendants will have to raise
and offer evidence on the duty-limitation issue in order for it to come up. Johnson, supra
note 9, at 331 n.44. However, that observation overlooks the fact that the "burden of
proof" traditionally entails not only the burden of raising an issue and of producing evidence,
but also the ultimate burden of persuasion. The point may be too subtle for most practical
purposes, but I count it a minor criticism of the Johnson view that it may entail shifting
from the defendant to the plaintiff the burden of persuasion on some affirmative defensive
issues.
89. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 320-21, 323.
90. Id. at 324.
91. Id. at 326-27 & n.31, 340-41.
92. See id. at 328.
93. See id. at 328 n.36, 341.
94. See id. at 340-41.
95. See id. at 326, 332, 333 n.56, 339-40, 341.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 334-35, 336-37.
98. See id. at 340.
1358 [Vol. 44
19841 WEX MALONE TOR TS SYMPOSIUM 1359
damages.99 If considerable judicial control is not retained over the victim-
fault issue, "[wie will have transformed duty questions into damage ques-
tions; we will have replaced legal issues with dollars-and-cents estimates."' 00
On the fundamental level of preference for resolutions by trial courts
and juries rather than appellate courts, I disagree with the Johnson view.' 0 '
The more important disagreement addresses the Johnson view's potential
for retarding resolution of the proper role of comparative fault in strict
liability' 2 and multiparty cases.
A. Should Duty-Risk Reasoning "Forgive" a Plaintiff's Fault in
Certain Comparative Fault Cases?
Professor Johnson clearly summarizes the various exceptions to and
circumventions of the contributory negligence doctrine that developed as
courts lost respect for it. ' 3 These included doctrines such as last clear
chance,' momentary forgetfulness,' and sudden emergency.' 6 Also in-
cluded were principles of occasional application, such as the idea that
the conduct of child plaintiffs should be judged by a forgiving standard,
that plaintiff conduct in general should be judged less stringently than
would be appropriate if the same actor were a defendant,' 7 and a
presumption that plaintiffs can be counted on to have taken great care
for their own safety. Probably none of these avoidance devices should
99. See id. at 338.
100. See id. at 340. For a similar statement by Malone, see supra text accompanying
note 8.
101. For the many expressions of Leon Green on the unwisdom of the shift of control
from trial to appellate courts, see Robertson, The Legal Philosophy of Leon Green, 56
TEx. L. REV. 393, 430-34 (1978).
102. Johnson believes that the duty-risk approach should resolve many strict liability
victim-fault issues. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 332, 336 n.66.
103. Johnson, supra note 9, at 324-25, 330-32, 334 n.57; see also Robertson, Comparative
Negligence, 24 LA. B.J. 180 (1976).
104. In most comparative fault jurisdictions, last clear chance has been abolished. See,
e.g., French v. Grigsby, 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978) (per curiam); Annot., 78 A.L.R. 3d
339 (1977); In two Louisiana comparative fault cases, last clear chance has been raised,
but neither court found it necessary to address whether the doctrine is still valid. See Starks
v. Kelly, 435 So. 2d 552, 556 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Sampy v. Roy Young, Inc., 425
So. 2d 284, 286 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
105. In Lombard v. Winn Dixie, Inc., 423 So. 2d 1281, 1282 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982),
the court appears to suggest that momentary forgetfulness might not survive in the com-
parative fault era.
106. Garsee v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 437 So. 2d 933, 936 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 440 So. 2d 762 (La. 1983), seems to hold that the sudden emergency exception
is still valid in comparative- fault cases.
107. See, e.g., Hebert v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 426 So. 2d 111, 117 (La. 1983). In
Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 500 n.10 (La. 1982), Justice Lemmon sug-
gests that this approach will be unnecessary in comparative fault cases.
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survive adoption of comparative fault legislation." 8 They have no apparent
virtue except to avoid the gross injustice frequently worked by applying
the contributory negligence bar, and they have been notoriously unpredict-
able in their application. Professors Malone and Johnson would
presumably not disagree with the prevailing view that the adoption of
comparative fault should obviate the necessity for continuing to use such
doctrinal and/or ad hoc approaches to forgive plaintiff negligence.' 9
Alongside the foregoing approaches to avoiding contributory negligence
in deserving cases, duty-risk approaches to the victim-fault problem also
developed. One such approach was to conclude that the plaintiff's duty
did not embrace the risk of the type of negligence of which the defendant
was guilty." ' More frequently, the approach was to conclude that the
defendant's duty did embrace the risk of the type of negligence of which
the plaintiff was guilty."' Whether the duty-risk avenue to forgiveness
of victim negligence should remain open in a comparative fault system
is the question under consideration. Examination of that question should
begin with the realization that any of the devices for avoiding contributory
negligence can without much difficulty be translated into a duty-risk
articulation." 2 For example, rather than stating that a defendant is liable
to the negligent plaintiff because the defendant had the last clear chance,
the judge could state that the duty defendant violated embraced the risk
of the form of negligence of which the plaintiff was guilty."' Plainly,
retention of the duty-risk approach to victim negligence questions entails
the likelihood of the survival of the (by hypothesis disapproved) avoidance
doctrines under another name.
Furthermore, the duty-risk approach to forgiveness of victim fault
had in its own right many of the demerits of the avoidance doctrines
108. See supra notes 103-06. Section 1 of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act attempts
to abolish such devices: "This rule [reduction of damages based on plaintiff's degree of
fault] applies whether or not under prior law the claimant's contributory fault constituted
a defense or was disregarded under applicable legal doctrines, such as last clear chance."
§ 1(a), 12 U.L.A. 36 (Supp. 1979), reprinted in 40 LA. L. REv. at 421.
109. In pure comparative fault systems, no good argument exists for retaining doctrines
like last clear chance. In modified systems in which the plaintiff's negligence above a cer-
tain percentage continues to bar recovery, the matter is not as clear. Nevertheless, most
of the modified systems that have considered the point, like the pure systems, have abolished
devices like last clear chance.
110. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 325 n.27; see also Brantley v. Brown, 277 So. 2d
141 (La. 1973).
Ill. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 333-34 & n.57.
112. Johnson states that the last clear chance family of avoidance doctrines have in
fact been largely subsumed under broad duty-risk principles and reasoning in the recent
jurisprudence. Johnson, supra note 9, at 332.
113. In Pence v. Ketchum, 326 So. 2d 831 (La. 1976), the majority used last clear chance
in favor of a negligent plaintiff, and Justice Dixon, concurring, used a duty-risk articula-
tion. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 328-30.
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like last clear chance. First, the duty-risk principles were like the doc-
trinal avoidance doctrines in that they could not change the all-or-nothing
nature of the contributory negligence system. All that could be accom-
plished was to shift the entire loss from the plaintiff to the defendant,
or to leave all of it on the plaintiff. It frequently does not seem very
fair to do either. If possible, a legal system should avoid having to decide
cases on the basis of determining which result is less unjust.'" Second,
the duty-risk approaches to victim fault resembled the doctrinal avoidance
doctrines in a fundamental unpredictability of application.'' Courts have
frequently rejected the reasoning that a defendant's duty should embrace
the risk of the plaintiff's negligence.'6 Other courts, determined to forgive
the plaintiff's negligence, have resorted to the doctrinal devices like last
clear chance,"' or to simply indicating that the plaintiff's negligent con-
duct was not enough of a cause in fact to bar recovery." 8
Nor can it be answered that duty-risk reasoning is but the enuncia-
tion of the principle that lies behind the doctrinal avoidance devices. To
a considerable degree, the application of duty-risk analysis to victim-fault
issues has itself become "rulified." The process of turning general-
principles reasoning into rules seems inevitable. Courts often seem to
perceive Baumgartner' as a rule: In an action against a negligent motorist,
pedestrian negligence does not count.' 20 Other similar rules have emerged
from duty-risk approaches, and some of them are quite implausible. For
example, the idea seems to have developed that the inattentiveness of a
customer who falls over an obstruction inside a store does not count,' 2 '
114. See Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 500 n.10 (La. 1982).
115. Duty-risk reasoning developed in the present context precisely as a way of avoiding
barring a plaintiff's recovery under the contributory negligence doctrine in cases in which
the court perceived that doctrine's injustice as too harsh. See Bays v. Lee, 432 So. 2d 941,
943-45 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); Frain v. State Farm Ins. Co., 421 So. 2d 1169, 1173
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1982). Hence, it is not surprising that there has not been much uniformity
of application. A fairly typical example of duty-risk reasoning on behalf of a negligent
plaintiff is Berry v. City of Monroe, 439 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983), in which
a child who negligently ran into a pillar was forgiven. Compare Wilkinson v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 411 So. 2d 22 (La. 1982), reversing the lower court's contributing
negligence finding on the facts.
116. For cases which distinguish the duty-risk cases and hold the plaintiff barred, see
CNG Producing Co. v. Columbia Gas Transmission, 709 F.2d 959, 964 (5th Cir. 1983);
Martin v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 546 F. Supp. 780, 784-85 (E.D. La. 1982), aff'd,
719 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1983).
117. See Dofflemyer v. Gilley, 384 So. 2d 435, 439 (La. 1980).
118. See Payne v. Louisiana Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 424 So. 2d 324, 329 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1982).
119. 356 So. 2d 400 (La. 1978).
120. See, e.g., Bays v. Lee, 432 So. 2d 941 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
121. See Dulaney v. Travelers Ins. Co., 434 So. 2d 578, 582-83 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983);
Lombard v. Winn Dixie, Inc., 423 So. 2d 1281, 1282 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
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but the same inattentiveness in the parking lot bars or diminishes
recovery. '22
The most important criticism of retention of the duty-risk approach
to forgiving some victim fault is the potential confusion that will result
in multiparty cases.' 23 Johnson furnishes an example of such confusion. 
24
Assume that Minor, hired by Employer to drive a truck in violation of
a "child labor" statute, negligently collides with a negligent other Driver.
(The example assumes workers' compensation law does not preclude a
tort suit against Employer.) In Minor's tort action against Employer and
Driver, the jury makes the following findings:




Treated straightforwardly as a comparative fault case, the resolution is
simple: Minor should recover $90,000, of which Employer should bear
$70,000 and Driver $20,000.25
But Johnson believes the judge should apply duty-risk reasoning to
conclude that Minor's negligence should be forgiven in the action against
Employer. By hypothesis, however, there is no reason for Minor's
negligence not to count in the action against Driver. On those assump-
tions, Johnson posits several possible solutions: (1) Employer owes
$100,000 and Driver owes nothing. The theory would be that Employer's
statutory duty is so broad and stringent as to protect both Minor and
Driver. Johnson rejects this solution as placing too many consequences
within the scope of Employer's duty. (2) Minor should recover $98,000,
of which Employer should bear $80,000 and Driver $18,000.26 The theory
would be that Minor's 10% fault should be applied to reduce the $20,000
Driver would owe if the case were treated as a straightforward comparative
fault case, without the duty-risk complication. Johnson does not say this,
but note that this resolution entails the conclusion that the duty violated
by Employer protects Driver to the tune of $2000.
122. See Dulaney v. Travelers Ins. Co., 434 So. 2d 578, 582-83 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983);
Abraham v. Hanover Ins. Co., 420 So. 2d 520, 528-29 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
123. See infra text accompanying notes 230-66 (designed as a full demonstration of that
confusion).
124. Johnson, supra note 9, at 337 n.67.
125. The judgment should provide that Employer and Driver are solidarily liable to Minor
for $90,000, and that they have contribution rights against each other such that Employer's
ultimate share is $70,000 and Driver's is $20,000.
126. The judgment should provide that Employer and Driver are solidarily liable for
$98,000, and that they have contribution rights against each other such that Employer's
ultimate share is $80,000 and Driver's is $18,000.
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Under Johnson's duty-risk assumptions, still other resolutions are
possible. For example: (3) Minor should recover $100,000, of which
Employer should bear $80,000 and Driver $20,000.111 The theory would
be that Driver, being unafflicted by duty-risk complexities, should owe
exactly what he would owe absent the duty-risk issue affecting Employer,
and the Employer should owe the remainder of Minor's recoverable
damages in order to reflect the decision that Minor's recovery against
Employer is not diminished by Minor's negligence. (4) Minor should
recover $100,000, of which Employer should bear $77,778 and Driver
$22,222. '28 The theory would be that Minor is entitled to his full $100,000,
and that contribution rights between Employer and Driver should be
worked out according to their degrees of fault as between themselves.
As between Employer and Driver, the fault findings were 7/9 and 2/9.29
This solution is dubious because it has Driver owing more than he would
absent the duty complication as between Employer and Minor. It cannot
be the case that the duty Employer violated, is designed to penalize Driver,
or that the duty Driver violated includes within its scope of protection the
risk that Driver will encounter an illegally employed negligent Minor who
is the beneficiary of someone else's duty that forgives the Minor's
negligence.
Probably other solutions are imaginable. Obviously such complexity
is undesirable. Johnson's own example illustrates that comparative fault
will be unworkable in multipafty cases if judges must frequently deter-
mine that a particular party's fault counts as against some of the litigants
but not others.
Several judges have suggested that these duty-risk approaches to vic-
tim fault should be jettisoned with the adoption of the comparative fault
system. 3 ' Others, influenced by the Johnson view and/or the argument
that article 2323's "[w]hen contributory negligence is applicable" language
means that all the old avoidance doctrines should persist, have indicated
that duty-risk reasoning will sometimes continue to apply so as to forgive
victim fault in comparative negligence cases.'"' The latter suggestions seem
127. The judgment should be tailored along the lines suggested supra notes 125-26.
128. See supra note 127.
129. For explanation of why the judge should mathematically interpret, rather than
slavishly follow, the jury-found percentages see infra note 235 and accompanying text.
130. See Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 422 So. 2d 1109, 1113-14 (La.
1982); Lombard v. Winn Dixie, Inc., 423 So. 2d 1281, 1282 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
131. See Starks v. Kelly, 435 So. 2d 552, 556 n.2 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (apparent
assumption that Baumgartner will continue to mean pedestrian negligence does not count
in an action against a motorist); Dulaney v. Travelers Ins. Co., 434 So. 2d 578, 582-83
(La. App. 1st Cir 1983) (full discussion and approval of the Johnson view as applied to
falls by store customers); Bays v. Lee, 432 So. 2d 941, 943-45 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983)
(full discussion and approval of the Johnson view and the article 2323 argument, holding
that Baumgartner still forgives pedestrian negligence); Frain v. State Farm Ins. Co., 421
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plainly wrong. In his dissent in Bays v. Lee,'32 Judge Ward cogently stated
the arguments for refusing to apply these duty-risk avoidance devices in
comparative fault cases:
To say that Baumgartner is consistent with a duty-risk analysis
is to say that a motorist has a duty to protect a pedestrian from
his own carelessness, but a pedestrian has no duty to protect
himself by not acting carelessly. . . . The safety of the public
demands that both motorists and pedestrians share the respon-
sibility to avoid accident or injury, and it is not inconsistent with
duty-risk analysis for each of the parties to owe a duty.
. ... I do not believe that the duty of a pedestrian to look
out for his own safety is so miniscule as to be ignored.
. . . . It is inconsistent with any theory of comparative negli-
gence to ignore the negligence of one of the parties.' 33
Judge Ward's view seems correct. To let the negligent victim go scot-
free usually is neither fair nor sensible. And I believe it counts as an
extremely telling argument against the Johnson view that, as his own ex-
ample illustrates, the continued applicability of duty-risk approaches to
victim fault will make many multiparty problems virtually insoluble.
B. Should Duty-Risk Reasoning Lead Courts to Conclude that
Certain Instances of Victim Fault Entirely Defeat Recovery in
Comparative Fault Cases?
The foregoing subsection of this article seeks to demonstrate why ap-
plying duty-risk reasoning to forgive certain instances of victim fault is
both unnecessary and an affirmatively bad idea in a comparative fault
system. The other prong of the Johnson view would use duty-risk reason-
ing to bar some plaintiffs entirely because of their fault. This subsection
seeks to demonstrate why that is an even worse idea.
Barring injury victims because of their fault was the core meaning
of contributory negligence. As a general proposition, the main idea of
comparative fault is to abolish that feature of tort law. The question under
discussion is whether courts should interpret the comparative fault legisla-
tion to effectuate that purpose, or whether exceptions to it, vestiges of
the old system, should remain in place.
So. 2d 1169, 1172-84 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982) (full discussion and approval of the Johnson
view and suggestion that negligence of the decedent, emotionally disturbed borrower of the
defendant's automobile, would not reduce recovery in action by survivors for negligent loaning
of auto).
132. 432 So. 2d 941 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
133. Id. at 945-46 (Ward, J., dissenting).
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I do not contend that Johnson's purpose is to cause judges to retain
portions of the law of contributory negligence in the guise of duty-risk
principles, only that such retention is a key effect of his view. Johnson's
main concern is doctrinal integrity. His view is predicated on the belief
that duty-risk reasoning beneficially enriches tort law by providing the
courts a vehicle for articulating principled non-liability conclusions. The
question is whether duty-risk reasoning is a useful vocabulary for that
purpose. In considering this question, one must be careful to distinguish
between appraisal of the justice of a particular outcome and evaluation
of the usefulness and integrity of the doctrinal basis for that outcome.
The Johnson view should be assessed from both perspectives. If the view
points toward results of which most would approve, that is certainly a
valid argument in its favor. On the other hand, if the favored results
would almost certainly be achieved independently of the Johnson view.
(i.e., if plenty of doctrine already supports them), then Johnson may have
proposed something that is at best unnecessary and at worst a potentially
frustrating source of confusion and uncertainty.
Professor Johnson suggests several examples of cases for which he
apparently believes duty-risk reasoning is the only or best way to achieve
or articulate the desirable no-liability conclusion."' Each of these cases
should be examined to see whether applying duty-risk reasoning to the
issue of victim fault is a necessary or useful way to achieve a desirable
outcome.
In Muse v. W.H. Patterson & Co.,' the plaintiff lost control of
his vehicle after dropping both right wheels off the paved surface of the
road onto the shoulder. The defendant, a highway contractor engaged
in the paving work, was sued for negligence in not providing adequate
warnings of the shoulder drop-off. The court concluded that the warn-
ings provided were probably inadequate and that the defendant was prob-
ably negligent, but stated that the plaintiff's fault was "the sole prox-
imate cause"' 36 of the accident.' 37 Muse is perhaps a cause-in-fact case.
The plaintiff testified that he knew construction work was in progress
and that the shoulders were low; the court stated that, given that
134. See Johnson, supra note 9. Three of Johnson's examples of the utility of duty-risk
reasoning for articulating no-liability conclusions did not involve victim-fault issues and will
not be considered here. See Dunn v. Bolden, 372 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979),
discussed in Johnson, supra note 9, at 335 & n.61; Stigler v. Bell, 276 So. 2d 799 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1973), cited in Johnson, supra note 9, at 336 n.65; and Martin v. State
Dept. of Hwys., 175 So. 2d 441 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), cited in Johnson, supra note
9, at 328 n. 35.
135. 182 So. 2d 665 (La. App. ist Cir. 1965), cited in Johnson, supra note 9, 328 n.35.
136. 182 So. 2d at 668, 670.
137. The pre-comparative fault jurisprudence is replete with "sole proximate cause" cases.
See, e.g., Lemelle v. State, 435 So. 2d 1162 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Ford v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 434 So. 2d 559 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983). What is usually meant is either simply
contributory negligence, or no negligence of the defendant.
1984] 1365
6LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
knowledge, a warning device would not have helped the plaintiff.'38 More
likely, Muse is a standard contributory negligence decision, and as such
was arguably disapproved by the subsequent supreme court decision in
Rue v. State.'39 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that Muse
is neither an outcome that is intuitively and obviously correct in some
important way nor a case in which comparative fault principles would
compel a recovery. If Muse arose today and the court believed that the
plaintiff's injuries would have been sustained had the defendant exercised
reasonable care, the plaintiff's case would still fail on cause in fact. On
the other hand, careful articulation of the problem as presenting a cause-
in-fact issue would aid and sharpen the focus and the analysis, and would
call for the court to consider whether an adequate warning might not
have reminded and further alerted the plaintiff to the dangers of getting
his wheels off the paved surface or to the lack of wisdom in trying to
come back up on the paved surface without slowing greatly. In neither
event would there be any virtue or necessity of saying that the plaintiff's
own fault removed him from the scope of protection of the defendant's
duty.
Dartez v. City of Sulphur"" was a suit against the city by a sidewalk
user who tripped on a piece of baling wire and fell across a bent parking
meter post. The plaintiff sued the city for negligence in not repairing the
meter post. The court concluded that the defendant was probably negligent
and that his conduct was a cause in fact of the injuries. But the court
denied recovery because defendant's conduct was not a legal cause of the
harm. Judge Tate, writing for the majority, defined legal cause in duty-
risk terms,'" and set forth several reasons why the plaintiff's injuries were
not within the scope of protection of the defendant's duty to remove the
bent post from sidewalk travel lanes. First, the plaintiff's fall resulted
from the negligence of a third person in leaving baling wire in his path,
not from the meter post.' 2 Second, the city's duty was designed to pro-
tect sidewalk users who needed the space occupied by the bent meter post
for passage, not for falling free of the post so as to hit the sidewalk." 3
The plaintiff was no more within the scope of protection of that duty
138. 182 So. 2d at 670.
139. 372 So. 2d 1197 (La. 1979).
140. 179 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965), discussed in Johnson, supra note 9, at
335-36.
141. See supra note 80.
142. 179 So. 2d at 485. Compare Justice Tate's treatment of the "fault of a third per-
son" defense in relational responsibility strict liability cases in Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365
So. 2d 1285, 1293-94 (La. 1978) ("The fault of a 'third person' which exonerates a person
from his own obligation . . .is that which is the sole cause of the damage, of the nature
of an irresistible and unforeseeable occurrence-i.e., where the damage resulting has no
causal relationship whatsoever to the fault of the [defendant]. ) (footnote omitted)).
143. 179 So. 2d at 485.
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than would have been someone who fell from the second floor of a near-
by building and happened to strike the meter post in falling.1 '" Finally,
the court reasoned that the plaintiff
passed the bent post several times a day to and from his home.
Knowing that it was a hazard to passage, he simply went around
it every time he passed. The evidence is clear that he would not
have fallen onto the post had he not stumbled upon the nearby
piece of wire.
[ . . T]he duty to remove the bent post from travel lanes ex-
isted in order to prevent injury to those who might proceed into
it unaware of its existence; not to prevent injury to those who
fully aware of it might nevertheless happen to fall upon it. 141
Obviously, Judge Tate's third point at most barely suggests a victim-
fault issue. The other points contain no such suggestion. Ample duty-risk
reasons clearly supported the no-liability conclusion independently of any
consideration of the plaintiff's prior knowledge of the bent post. Pro-
fessor Johnson agrees that duty-risk reasoning is not confined to victim-
fault issues." '6 Dartez would yield the same result today, without any
necessity of addressing duty-risk reasoning to victim fault as such.
Cates v. Beauregard Electric Cooperative"14 is a well-known and
controversial"" decision in which the supreme court upheld summary judg-
ment on the basis of contributory negligence against a sixteen-year-old
boy who climbed a twenty-nine-foot pole and came into contact with the
defendant's electric line, carrying 7620 useless volts and leading nowhere.
Johnson suggests that the decision can best be justified as concluding that
the plaintiff's wrongful conduct took him out of the scope of the defen-
dant's duty. "4 I disagree. Cates appears to be an unfortunate application
144. Id. Judge Tate's reasoning at this point is consistent with my view, explained infra
notes 197-211 and accompanying text, that one can often isolate the victim-fault issue from
issues pertinent to the case in chief by hypothesizing a relevant fault-free victim or by analogiz-
ing the plaintiff to a relevant fault-free victim.
145. 179 So. 2d at 483-85.
146. Johnson, supra note 9, at 327 n.32; see also supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
147. 328 So. 2d 367 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976), discussed in Johnson,
supra note 9, at 330.
148. Justice Tate, dissenting in Cates, pointed out several ways of avoiding the applica-
tion of the contributory negligence bar against the plaintiff, including labelling the defen-
dant as grossly negligent and invoking the standard "gross or aggravated negligence" ex-
ception to contributory negligence. He also suggested that the injuries were not within the
scope of the plaintiff's duty. 328 So. 2d at 372 (Tate, J., dissenting).
149. Cates involved a landowner defendant as well as the main defendant, the power
company. The line had once led to the landowner's farmhouse, which had long since been
abandoned. Exoneration of the landowner might be seen as consistent With the recent deci-
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of contributory negligence at its worst. It is certainly the kind of case
that comparative fault was designed to cure. Addressing a very similar
problem in Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Co., ' Justice Lemmon recently
expressed his relief that comparative fault will avoid the necessity of such
harsh determinations. "'
The plaintiff in Richards v. Marlow' was a thirteen-year-old girl who
slipped while trying to "tightrope" a horizontal pipe that was part of
the substructure of the defendants' pier. The decking of the pier had
washed away several years before the accident. The court held that the
plaintiff was barred by contributory negligence and assumption of risk." 3
The trial court had found the pier unreasonably dangerous, but the ap-
pellate court's disposition made it unnecessary to address the correctness
of that conclusion. Assuming the trial court was correct, Richards is a
case that ought to turn out differently in a comparative fault system. If
the decrepit pier was dangerous at all, one of the central risks was in-
juries to children, whose frequent presence in the area was known to the
defendants. Thus, it is difficult to view Richards as a case in which duty-
risk reasoning should exonerate the defendants.
Johnson's final example of a case in which duty-risk reasoning should
wholly exonerate defendant is a hypothetical rather than a reported
decision.
Consider the situation of a grocery-store operator and his
patrons. There is certainly a non-statutory duty imposed on the
operator to keep his aisles reasonably clear of obstructions such
as boxes, displays, and foreign objects. Suppose that he has done
so and has only an occasional overflow box or display well against
the side of the aisle so as to present no hazard to the ordinary
shopper. But suppose that a patron, finishing an animated con-
versation with another shopper, is taking a few steps backward
down the aisle and falls over the box. Should it not be said that
although the operator has a duty to protect his patrons, he has
no duty to protect this particular patron against the product of
his own conduct?' 54
sion in Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983), i.e., as part of the court's "aban-
doned farmhouse" law. See generally L. GREEN, W. MALONE, W. PEDRICK & J. RAHL,
CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS at IX (1957) (fact groupings ultimately better guide to tort
law than doctrinal analysis).
150. 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982).
151. Id. at 500 n.10.
152. 347 So. 2d 281 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
153. In the sense in which assumption of risk, disscused infra text accompanying notes
169-86, was used in Richards, it referred solely to a form of victim negligence. Certainly
in that usage, assumption of risk should not survive in the comparative fault era. Id. at 283.
154. Johnson, supra note 9, at 334-35 (footnotes omitted).
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My answer is no. If the court feels that the obstruction presented no
foreseeable hazard to aisle-users, what should be said is that the defen-
dant was not negligent. However, if the defendant was negligent, that
would be so precisely because of the risk that some patron would manage
not to look where he was going even on the side of the aisle, and it would
be improper to conclude that merely walking backward should take the
plaintiff out of the class of protected persons. This hypothetical, in fact,
well illustrates the reasons for excluding duty-risk reasoning from the focus
on the victim's fault as such. If the defendant owes a duty to any shop-
per not to have the obstruction where it was, then a trip by a backward-
walking shopper is not outside the scope of that duty. This shopper is
not Judge Tate's unexpected faller from the sky; he is just another shop-
per, at fault in a somewhat, unusual way, but certainly not completely
outside the range of protected victims or risks. His fault should diminish,
not bar, his recovery.
The foregoing examples do not demonstrate any need for duty-risk
reasoning to be applied to the victim-fault issue in order to provide the
courts a means of articulating desirable and principled results. In each
case in which judgment for the defendant seems justified, ample doctrine
exists to facilitate and explain that conclusion, without any necessity of
stating that the plaintiff's fault removed him from the scope of protec-
tion of the defendant's duty. The legitimate reasons for non-liability in
these cases are more straightforward, less abstract, closer to the facts,
and more suitable for alerting and focusing counsel in future cases on
the kinds of facts that matter. In appropriate cases, for example, the courts
may conclude that the defendant's conduct was not a cause in fact of
the harm (e.g., Muse), " or that the defendant was not negligent, or that
the accident was the product of fault of a third person that outweighed
and eclipsed the defendant's relatively minuscule fault (e.g., Dartez). 6
Further, legitimate duty-risk reasoning should continue to be available
when focused on factors other than victim fault. Forsaking the habit of
applying duty-risk reasoning to the issue of victim fault would not entail
forsaking the duty-risk analysis itself. As Judge Tate indicated in Dartez,'
a court may quite legitimately conclude that the accident was not within
the scope of the defendant's duty. This conclusion, however, was not and
should not be based upon the plaintiff's fault having taken him outside
the scope of protection of the defendant's duty. Rather, it should be based
on general duty-risk reasoning of a type recognized and approved by
Johnson.' In Dartez, the accident was beyond the scope of the defen-
dant's duty because the court felt that the plaintiff might as well have
155. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
157. Id.
158. Johnson, supra note 9, at 327 n.32.
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fallen from the sky; pedestrians falling on that bent parking meter were
simply not foreseeable. The plaintiff in Dartez failed to recover, and would
still fail to recover in a comparative fault case, because he was in essence
the "unforeseeable plaintiff" so well known to tort law.15 9 The duty-risk
reasons for denying recovery had little if anything to do with the victim's
fault. 160
Thus, ample doctrine is available to argue for and articulate the no-
liability conclusion in all of the examples considered in which that con-
clusion seems correct. It is certainly true that the facts of some of the
foregoing cases do not seem to allow for the persuasive articulation of
a no-liability conclusion on any other basis than the fault of the victim.
When that is true, it is because the only remaining potential obstacle to
recovery is the fault of the victim. In such cases, recovery should be
granted. Comparative fault should be allowed to do its intended work.
If duty-risk reasoning need not be applied to the victim-fault issue
in order to provide the courts with sufficient doctrine to reach and ar-
ticulate just results, then such reasoning should be avoided. Several reasons
support this conclusion. In the first place, too much doctrine is a hin-
drance to the proper operation of the injuries litigation system. It increases
the potential for confusion, multiplies litigation points, and obfuscates
the necessary inquiry by counsel and court into the facts that matter. Fur-
ther, in this context, the duty-risk approach is not a precise or evocative
tool. It is too open-ended, too general, and too unpredictable in its
operation.'' For example, as acknowledged by Professor Johnson,' 62 the
defense of assumption of risk is easily translated into a statement that
the plaintiff's conduct removed him from the scope of protection of defen-
dant's duty. 6 3 Indeed, duty-risk reasoning closely resembles the "undif-
159. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
160. The Dartez duty-risk reasoning is reminiscent of Hill v. Lundin & Assocs., Inc.,
260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (1972), in which the court concluded that the defendant's
duty encompassed risks created by ladders as vertical objects of danger but not as horizon-
tal objects of danger. See generally Robertson, supra note 79. In Dartez, the defendant's
fault created a protected risk of impact with the meter post from the horizontal, but not
from the vertical. The Hill and Dartez cases take a narrow view of the scope of protection
of the duties involved in those cases, and there would be nothing importantly wrong about
the cases turning out the other way. The important present point, however, is that if Dartez
arose today, and the court was in fact entirely satisfied with its duty-risk analysis, the same
outcome should be obtained. If, on the other hand, victim fault was in fact a subliminal
influence in the case, it should be surfaced and quantified. Submerging victim fault into
the array of considerations that have traditionally removed injuries from the scope of pro-
tection of the defendant's duty is detrimental to clarity of analysis, because it fails to insist
upon or point toward criteria of general application that would distinguish those faulty
plaintiffs who should lose outright from those who should merely have their recoveries
reduced.
161. Cf. supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
162. Johnson, supra note 9, at 332 & nn.47 & 48, 336 n.65.
163. For discussion of assumption of risk, see infra text accompanying notes 169-86.
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ferentiated concept"" 4 of assumption of risk in that it fails to delineate
between the types of conduct which will defeat recovery and those which
will merely reduce it. When a court states that a plaintiff loses because
he assumed the risk, or that he loses because his conduct removed him
from the scope of protection of the defendant's duty, all we really know
is that the plaintiff lost the case. I would subject duty-risk reasoning as
applied to the question whether victim fault removes the plaintiff from
the reach of the defendant's duty to the same kinds of criticisms so fre-
quently levelled by eminent torts scholars at assumption of risk: It is
"obfuscatory"; 5 it does not reveal its criteria for application; it makes
it possible "for the court to cherish the illusion that it [has] taken the
easy way out.""' Such a doctrine "may either prevent an accurate analysis
by the court of the real problems involved in reaching the decision, or
permit the court to write an opinion which elides or covers up the real
basis of the decision." ' ' 67
The foregoing criticisms of permitting courts to state that the defen-
dant is not liable because the plaintiff's fault removed him from the pro-
tection of the defendant's duty seem apt. But even if these criticisms are
wrong, the application of duty-risk reasoning to the victim-fault issues
clearly makes multiparty cases too difficult."' That criticism alone should
suffice to carry the argument.
C. Assumption of Risk
In the torts literature generally, much has been made of the fact that
assumption of risk has many meanings."' The term has sometimes meant
express consent, manifested before the injury (waiver, release) or after
it (settlement, receipt and release). It has also been used to mean implied
consent through consensual arrangement or through conduct (old landlord-
tenant, employer-employee, landowner-invitee cases); the absence of any
duty owed by defendant (old land occupier-licensee cases, land occupier-
trespasser cases); or the absence of defendant negligence (the "ballpark
cases"). Most often, however, assumption of risk denotes a particular
form of victim negligence, i.e., proceeding unreasonably in the face of
a known danger.
Even as a matter of abstract analysis, any attempt to separate mean-
ings (2) through (4) is hopeless. Further, in practice the pre-comparative
fault courts had no meaningful impulse to distinguish among meanings
164. See Annot., 16 A.L.R. 4th 700, 703 (1982).
165. See Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 LA.
L. REv. 5, 15 (1961).
166. See Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REv. 17, 17 (1961).
167. See Wade, supra note 165, at 15.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 230-66.
169. See generally Symposium: Assumption of Risk, 22 LA. L. REv. 1-166 (1961).
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(2) through (5). In a pre-comparative fault system, the effect of assump-
tion of risk in any of the above forms was the same: plaintiff was denied
recovery. That neither the courts"' nor the commentators" ' succeeded
in achieving much clarification is therefore not surprising.
In a comparative fault system, however, clarification is required. Essen-
tial clarification includes deciding which forms of assumption of risk
"really" denoted victim fault as a bar to recovery, ' and whether all
victim fault is to be quantified so as to reduce rather than bar recovery.
When assumption of risk signals something other than victim fault (i.e.,
some defect in the plaintiff's case in chief), a further and highly desirable
clarification would result from abolition of the term assumption of risk
in favor of a more precise description of the particular problem (e.g.,
the defendant was entitled to rely on plaintiff's express consent to the
conduct in question).
The vast majority of assumption of risk cases involve nothing more
than a particular form of plaintiff negligence." 3 In the Louisiana
jurisprudence, assumption of risk has repeatedly been defined as follows:
"It is fundamental that, in order to assume a risk, one must knowingly
and voluntarily encounter a risk which caused him harm. Plaintiff must
understand and appreciate the risk involved and must accept the risk as
well as the inherent possibility of danger because of the risk.""'  That
form of victim fault has traditionally barred recovery, in both negligence
and strict liability cases."' It operated as an affirmative defense, which
defendant must plead and prove." 6
The comparative fault adoption should be interpreted to abolish this
form of assumption of risk as a bar to recovery."' Most comparative
170. See Annot., 16 A.L.R. 4th 700, 703-04 (1982).
171. See generally Symposium, supra note 169.
172. See also infra notes 189-211 and accompanying text.
173. See generally Symposium, supra note 169.
174. See Dofflemyer v. Gilley, 384 So. 2d 435, 438 (La. 1980), and cases cited therein.
175. See, e.g., Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
176. Occasional cases have suggested that assumption of risk as defined above is a negation
of the defendant's duty. In Dorry v. LaFleur, 399 So. 2d 559, 561 (La. 1981), the court
stated: "As used here, assumption of risk does not merely bar plaintiff from recovery;
rather it says in effect that because of a relationship voluntarily engaged by plaintiff, as
to him the defendant has done nothing wrong." In a pre-comparative fault system-in which
the affirmative defense of assumption of risk bars recovery-such reasoning is entirely cir-
cular unless intended to suggest that the burden of pleading and proof on the assumed
risk issue has been shifted to the plaintiff. The courts never seem to mean that. The idea
that the defendant owes no duty to one who assumes the risk should not survive in a com-
parative fault system for the same reason that duty-risk articulations that the defendant's
duty does not protect the negligent victim should not survive: Both would be potentially
arbitrary and ad hoc judicial exceptions to the effects of comparative fault.
177. It is hoped that the supreme court will so state in its response to the certification
in Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 717 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 59-62 and accom-
panying text.
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fault jurisdictions are moving in that direction.' 78 This movement is a
desirable development because the distinction between assumption of risk
and contributory negligence is notoriously obscure;' 79 because the courts
have often found ways to avoid barring plaintiffs who from all appearances
did assume the risk, 180 thus importing an undesirable unpredictability into
the jurisprudence; because victims who proceed in the face of a known
danger may frequently be less blameworthy than victims who fail to
discover the danger; and because resolution of complex multiparty cases
in a comparative fault system is made too difficult by retention of victim-
fault defenses that bar recovery. '
I have found no Louisiana decisions addressing the status of the
assumption of risk defense under comparative fault. The only agreeable
resolution is abolition of assumed risk as a defense separate from com-
parative fault, and provision for quantifying the degree of fault attributable
to the plaintiff's proceeding in the face of a known danger so as to
diminish but not bar recovery. In a case presently before the supreme court
on proposed certification,' 82 it will not be a useful outcome for the court
to answer that contributory negligence mitigates damages in products liabil-
ity actions unless the court at the same time deals with assumed risk. The
court should interpret the terms "contributory negligence" and
"negligence" in Civil Code article 2323 generically rather than as narrow
178. See Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975); Annot., 16 A.L.R.
4th 700 (1982).
179. The traditional effort at maintaining that distinction has been insistence that assump-
tion of risk inquires into the plaintiff's subjective awareness of the danger, whereas con-
tributory negligence is an objective inquiry. See, e.g., Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258
La. 1067, 1088-89, 249 So. 2d 133, 141 (1971). The effort does not succeed, as suggested
by the discussion in Dorry v. LaFleur, 399 So. 2d 559, 562-63 (La. 1981), as to whether
an objective "should have known" element has crept into the recent assumption of risk
decisions.
180. See, e.g., Dofflemyer v. Gilley, 384 So. 2d 435, 438-39 (La. 1980); Brantley v.
Brown, 277 So. 2d 141, 143-44 (La. 1973).
181. Other defenses exist to certain types of injury cases that, like assumed risk, occa-
sionally are articulated as limits upon the defendant's duty rather than as affirmative victim-
fault defenses. See infra notes 188, 199-201 and accompanying text. These doctrines should
likewise be abandoned. For example, courts have said that the products liability defense
of "misuse" really means that the product defendant owes the plaintiff no duty because
the product is not required to be designed, manufactured, and marketed so as to be reasonably
safe in such use. See, e.g., Jones v. Menard, 559 F.2d 1282, 1285 n.4 (5th Cir. 1977).
In other words, misuse is not an affirmative defense at all, but is rather a negation of
the "product in normal use" element of the plaintiff's case in chief in strict products liability
cases. That usage of the "misuse" term can be abandoned without any loss to the body
of useful doctrine. The courts can simply say that the plaintiff failed to show that the
product was dangerous in normal use. If the court cannot plausibly so state on the facts
before it, then the defendant should be liable, and the plaintiff's recovery should be reduced
by the percentage of fault found against him. Misuse, like assumption of risk, should never
function as a victim-fault affirmative defense that bars recovery.
182. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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doctrinal categories, recognizing that assumption of risk in its standard
use merely denotes a particularized form of plaintiff negligence.' 83
The recent court of appeal decisions indicating sympathy for or ac-
ceptance of the Johnson view'8 should also be scrutinized by the supreme
court. While the Johnson view does not frontally assert that assumption
of risk should be retained as an affirmative defense,'" retention is
unavoidably implicated: Stating that the plaintiff who proceeded
unreasonably in the face of a known danger is beyond the scope of pro-
tection of the defendant's duty'86 is precisely equivalent to stating that
the plaintiff is barred because he assumed the risk. If one is convinced
that retention of all-or-nothing affirmative defenses like assumption of
risk seriously detracts from the rational operation of a comparative fault
system, then the Johnson view should be rejected.
D. Necessity of Distinguishing Between "Affirmative Defenses" and
"'Defensive Doctrines"
Running through the foregoing criticisms of the Johnson view is the
assertion that the view contributes to obscuring a necessary distinction
between affirmative defenses and defensive doctrines. This matter must
now be addressed frontally.
Any plaintiff in a tort suit must establish certain elements in order
to recover. The standard elements of the plaintiff's case in chief are: (1)
the existence of a duty owed by the defendant; (2) breach of that duty;
(3) that the plaintiff's injury was within the duty's scope of protection;
(4) that the defendant's conduct was a cause in fact of the harm. Except
for certain intentional torts permitting recovery of nominal damages, the
plaintiff must also establish the existence and amount of his damages.' 87
183. The commentators addressing the question whether Civil Code article 2323 can be
read to permit quantification of forms of victim fault other than traditional "contributory
negligence" have split. Professor Wade believes that such a reading is possible. Wade, supra
note 28, at 313-14. Professor Chamallas disagrees. Chamallas, supra note 9, at 375 n.5.
However, neither commentator analyzes the point.
184. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
185. But cf. Johnson, supra note 9, at 336 n.65.
186. See id. at 336-37.
187. The elements set forth in the text apply to intentional tort and strict liability cases
as well as negligence cases, the only difference being that those bodies of law have "cap-
tured" the elements in various statements of doctrine. For example, the scope of protection
issue in intentional torts is usually handled by the "transferred intent" fiction.
Stating that the plaintiff must establish these elements implies that he must plead and
prove them. However, it is obvious that in many cases, the existence of several of the elements
will not rise to the stature of a contested issue. Consider, for example, the case set forth
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's Form 9. 28 U.S.C. App. of Forms (1982). The
form of complaint recommended in that Official Form states that the plaintiff was crossing
a public highway when injured in specified ways by the defendant's negligent operation of
an automobile. That statement adequately pleads existence of duty, scope of protection of
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The defendant can defeat the plaintiff's recovery by negating any one
of the requisites of the case in chief. Frequently the attempted negation
takes the form of invoking a defensive doctrine. The term defensive doc-
trine refers to any matter which the defendant can raise to rebut one or
more of the elements of the plaintiff's case in chief. In negligence litiga-
tion, an example of a defensive doctrine is "unavoidable accident," which
can negate the element of breach of duty. In products liability litigation,
an example of a defensive doctrine is "misuse," which can negate the
elements of the existence of duty or causation. '88
The defendant can also defeat the plaintiff's recovery by establishing
the elements of an affirmative defense. The term affirmative defense refers
to any matter which, if properly pleaded and proved by the defendant,
will defeat the plaintiff's recovery despite the strength of the plaintiff's
case in chief. The standard examples of affirmative defenses were con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk.
In a system in which the affirmative defenses operate to bar recovery,
courts frequently have no reason to distinguish between affirmative
defenses and defensive doctrines. Unless the particular litigation raises a
difficulty respecting which party has the burden of pleading and proving
the matter, the distinction need not be made.'89 Professor Johnson is ac-
curate and insightful in pointing out that many of the early contributory
negligence cases are decided in such a way as to leave entirely unclear
whether the court thought the defendant's duty was negated by victim
fault, or whether victim fault was operating as an affirmative defense.' 90
Hence, confusion as to the distinction between defensive doctrines
and affirmative defenses might be said to be endemic to the pre-
comparative fault jurisprudence. In a comparative fault system, however,
erstwhile contributory negligence has a new effect: It does not defeat but
only reduces recovery. Hence, it is now necessary to distinguish that af-
firmative defense from a defensive doctrine such as Johnson's no-duty
approach, because the effects are now different. Furthermore, all com-
parative fault adoptions raise questions respecting how other victim-fault
doctrines-treated in the former jurisprudence almost willy-nilly, sometimes
as defensive doctrines and sometimes as affirmative defenses-should be
treated. The problem is how to distinguish those applications of the doc-
duty, breach of duty, cause in fact, and damages. (The degree of factual detail required
by various pleading systems is not the present concern.) It is highly unlikely that existence
and scope of protection of duty will become litigation points in that case.
188. See Jones v. Menard, 559 F.2d 1282, 1285 n.4 (5th Cir. 1977).
189. Professor Johnson appears to acknowledge that his recommendations have the ef-
fect of transmuting affirmative defenses into defensive doctrines, and that one logical con-
sequence of that transmutation might be a shifting of the burden of proof. He deals with
that problem by stating that he does not mean for the burden to shift. Johnson, supra
note 9, at 331 n.44; see also supra note 88.
190. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 319-23; see also Annot., 78 A.L.R. 3d 339, 345 (1977).
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trines which should only diminish recovery from those which should defeat
recovery.
One context in which it is easy to see the necessity for distinguishing
between affirmative defenses and defensive doctrines is the case in which
the principal allegation of fault against the defendant is failure to warn
of the danger that befell the plaintiff. In such a case, the defendant will
usually seek to show that the plaintiff either had or should have had the
requisite knowledge on his own. In a comparative fault system, should
such a showing defeat or only diminish recovery? If the plaintiff's
knowledge (or faulty failure to acquire knowledge) negates any element
of the case in chief, recovery will be defeated. On the other hand, if the
plaintiff's knowledge or faulty failure to acquire knowledge is treated as
an affirmative defense, such fault will be quantified and reduce but not
eliminate recovery.
No clear approach has emerged in the jurisprudence. Many decisions
suggest that a showing that the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the danger means that the defendant owed no duty, or breached no duty,
or that the defendant's conduct was not a cause in fact of the injuries. 9'
Under that analysis, the result, no liability, would be the same under com-
parative fault as under the previous system. However, other cases indicate
that a plaintiff who knew or should have known of the danger "would
have shared the fault" of the defendant.' 9 2 Under this analysis, the plain-
tiff's recovery would be diminished but not defeated. No case has focused
squarely on the question. It is not unusual for courts to use the plain-
tiff's knowledge (or faulty failure to acquire knowledge) as both a defen-
sive doctrine and an affirmative defense within the same case.,"
191. See Breazeale v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 564 F. Supp. 1541, 1544-45 (E.D. La. 1983);
Johnson v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 396 F. Supp. 362, 364 (W.D. La. 1975); Jackson v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 436 So. 2d 698, 701 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 So.
2d 217 (La. 1983); LeBlanc v. Wall, 430 So. 2d 1130, 1132-34 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 438 So. 2d 571 (La. 1983); Lovell v. Earl Grissmer Co., 422 So. 2d 1344, 1350-51
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 871 (La. 1983); Sumner v. Foremost
Ins. Co., 417 So. 2d 1327, 1331-34 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
192. Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978), was a pre-comparative
fault case in which the court stated that such a plaintiff would have shared the defendant's
fault "and could not recover." Id. at 930. Jowers v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 435
So. 2d 575 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983), was a comparative fault case in which the court cited
Chappuis for the proposition that a plaintiff who knew or should have known of the danger
would share the defendant's fault, id. at 579, but significantly omitted the Chappuis indica-
tion that such a plaintiff could not recover.
193. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Wall, 430 So. 2d 1130, 1132-34 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 438 So. 2d 571 (La. 1983); Lovell v. Earl Grissmer Co., 422 So. 2d 1344, 1350-53
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), writ denied, 427 So. 2d 871 (La. 1983); Sumner v. Foremost
Ins. Co., 417 So. 2d 1327, 1331-34 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983). The Lovell court also sug-
gested that "[ilnasmuch as comparative negligence is a doctrine intended to ameliorate some
of the inequities in the present system of tort law, a failure to apply the doctrine across
the board in strict liability cases would be enigmatic." 422 So. 2d at 1352, n.4.
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Many of the pre-comparative fault cases in which the plaintiff's
knowledge or faulty failure to acquire knowledge defeated recovery would
doubtless turn out the same way under comparative fault, because the
bottom line in such cases is actually the court's perception that the defen-
dant was guilty of no actionable fault. But closer analysis is required by
the comparative fault legislation. Peyton v. Bogan'94 presents a useful ex-
ample of the problem, and its facts suggest a potential solution. Several
men, including the plaintiff, an experienced mechanic, were helping the
defendant get his car started. Somehow the plaintiff's finger was amputated
by the fan blade or belt. He alleged that the defendant was negligent
in trying to start the engine while the plaintiff had his hand on or near
the fan. A key fact was that, when the defendant tried to start the car
on instructions from another of the helpers, everyone was clear of the
engine; however, "in the brief interval between the instruction and defen-
dant's attempt to start the engine, [plaintiff] stepped forward and placed.
his right hand near the alternator belt."'
95
The Peyton court denied recovery and provided an explanation that
seems to invoke virtually every available defensive doctrine and affirmative
defense.
In considering a defendant's duty to a particular person con-
sideration should be given to the latter's age, maturity, experience,
familiarity with the danger and other such factors. ...
The record shows that [plaintiff] is an experienced and
knowledgeable mechanic. As such he must have been fully aware
of the danger presented by moving engine parts. A person of
[plaintiff's] age and experience did not need a warning of the
danger with which he was already fully familiar. [Plaintiff not
within the scope of protection of defendant's duty? Defendant's
conduct not a cause in fact of plaintiff's injury?] Defendant's
duty to [plaintiff] could be fulfilled by providing notice of when
the danger would be present, that is, when he would attempt to
start the car.
The defendant was assisted by Curry White in attempting to
start the car. White, who stood by the engine, instructed defen-
dant when to attempt to start the engine. White gave this instruc-
tion only when all were clear of the engine. The instructions by
White also served as notice to the others present of when defen-
dant would attempt to start the car.
In enlisting the assistance of White, who was outside the car
and could determine when it would be safe to start the engine,
defendant fulfilled the duty of care he owed to plaintiff. [Defen-
194. 434 So. 2d 540 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
195. Id. at 541.
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dant was not negligent?] When White instructed defendant to "try
it" and, thus, gave notice that the car was about to be started,
all were clear. The plaintiff placed his hand in a position to be
injured only because he ignored the notice or did not hear what
all the others did hear, and what he should have heard. [Plain-
tiff's fault bars recovery?]
The defendant breached no duty owed to plaintiff to protect
against the injury suffered. [No negligence? Plaintiff's injury not
within duty's scope of protection?] Defendants are not liable for
injuries caused by [plaintiff's] failure to hear what he should have
heard or his disregard of it. [Plaintiff's fault bars recovery?] The
district judge properly found that defendant was not negligent. 96
On the facts found, Peyton seems correctly decided. The analytical
problem is created by the victim-fault language in the opinion. As the
case was actually decided, the fact that the plaintiff was an experienced
mechanic seems irrelevant. The nub of the decision is that the defendant
did nothing wrong: a warning sufficient to the group of helpers was pro-
vided. The defendant would not have been liable to any of the other men
either. (If there had been a child or a mentally deficient person in the
crowd, the defendant might have been found negligent in not affording
that person a special warning if he knew or should have known of the
foreseeability of foolishness on that person's part.) The Peyton facts sug-
gest a useful approach to the defensive doctrine versus affirmative defense
distinction: On otherwise identical facts,' 97 would a fault-free victim be
entitled to recovery? If not, the plaintiff's case in chief contains a fatal
flaw. If so, the plaintiff's fault should be quantified and reduce, but not
bar, recovery.
The problem under discussion and the suggested solution transcend
the failure-to-warn cases. The problem is largely one of a pre-comparative
fault vocabulary that wove considerations of victim fault throughout the
elements of the case in chief and the affirmative defenses. Examples in-
clude statements that the plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause
of the injuries;' 98 applying duty-risk reasoning to conclude that the plain-
196. Id. at 542-43 (citation & footnote omitted).
197. That one can sensibly posit otherwise identical facts-i.e., isolate the faulty character
of the victim's conduct from all other factors in the case-is the thrust of the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act approach to the problem under consideration. See infra text accom-
panying notes 202-04. The approach is also suggested by Judge Tate's opinion in Dartez
v. City of Sulphur, 179 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). See supra note 144 and accom-
panying text. The approach is implicated in the opinions of Justices Watson, Entrevia v.
Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983), and Lemmon, Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So.
2d 493 (La. 1982). See infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text; see also infra text accom-
panying note 211.
198. See, e.g., Lemelle v. State, 435 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Ford
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 434 So. 2d 559, 562 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
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tiff's fault removed him from the scope of protection of the defendant's
duty; 99 treatments of the plaintiff's "misuse" of a product without clari-
fying whether misuse is a victim-fault affirmative defense or a negation
of an element of the case in chief;20 ° and treatments of "assumption of
risk" that fail to clarify whether it is a victim-fault affirmative defense
or a negation of an element of the case in chief.2"' Professor John Wade's
discussion of the Louisiana comparative fault legislation states the dif-
ficulty as follows:
What about other forms of plaintiff's fault, such as assumption
of risk, misuse of a product, or avoidable consequences? These
concepts raise difficult problems of verbalization since the terms
cover various meanings in different situations, such as plaintiff's
fault, consent to the conduct, lack of duty or breach of duty on
the part of the defendant, or lack of proximate cause.2"2
Wade also suggests an approach to a solution:
Reduction of damages for comparative fault should be confined
to the meaning of those terms involving plaintiff's fault and should
not apply to the others. The problem is how to say this clearly.
The Louisiana provisions resolve the problem by ignoring it and
leaving it for the courts to solve without direction. The Uniform
[Comparative Fault] Act meets the problem by saying in section
l(b) that the Act covers and includes "unreasonable assumption
of risk not constituting an enforceable express consent, misuse
of a product for which the defendant otherwise would be liable,
and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate
damages." The language may perhaps be improved upon, but it
at least gives the court useful guidance. Failure to make provi-
199. In Martin v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 546 F. Supp. 780, 784-85 (E.D. La.
1982), aff'd, 719 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1983), the court held that the plaintiff's fault removed
him from the scope of the defendant's duty, and then translated that into a statement that
the plaintiff's fault was the sole proximate cause of the injuries.
200. See Harris v. Atlanta Stove Works, 428 So. 2d 1040, 1043-44 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 So. 2d 1106 (La. 1983); Deville v. Calcasieu Parish Gravity Drainage Dist.
# 5, 422 So. 2d 631, 633-35 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Avoyelles Country Club v. Walter
Kidde & Co., 338 So. 2d 379, 382-83 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976). In contrast the following
decisions make clear that "misuse" is not an affirmative defense, but a defensive doctrine
that negates either duty or cause in fact: Woods v. International Harvester Co., 697 F.2d
635, 637-38 (5th Cir. 1983); LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985, 988-89
(5th Cir. 1980); Jones v. Menard, 559 F.2d 1282, 1285 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976); Khoder v. AMF,
Inc., 539 F.2d 1078, 1081 (5th Cir. 1976); Perkins v. Emerson Elec. Co., 482 F. Supp.
1347, 1353 (W.D. La. 1980)..
201. See LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985, 989, 991 (5th Cir.
1980); Dorry v. LaFleur, 399 So. 2d 559, 561 (La. 1981); Williams v. New Orleans Pub.
Serv., 421 So. 2d 278, 280-81 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 427 So. 2d 1207
(La. 1983).
202. Wade, supra note 28, at 313.
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sion has given some other states considerable trouble and the Loui-
siana legislature should seriously consider the matter." °3
The Wade/Uniform Act suggestion is similar to the one asserted by this
writer: if the defendant would "otherwise" (i.e., otherwise than victim
fault) be liable, then he is liable, and the plaintiff's fault diminishes
recovery. 204
The suggested analysis is compatible with important language in two
recent supreme court decisions. In Entrevia v. Hood,"0 5 the plaintiff, an
adult trespasser, fell through the rotten steps of the defendant's dilapidated
vacant rural house. The house was fenced and posted with "no trespass-
ing" signs. Recovery was denied on the conclusion that the defendant's
property presented no unreasonable risk of harm. Justice Watson's con-
curring opinion notes the difficulty:
Clearly, the building was a "ruin." As such, it had little utility
and it was likely that children, tramps or others straying on the
premises might be injured. The owner could not reasonably be
required to destroy or restore his rural ruin. Faced with the
owner's reasonableness and an unsympathetic plaintiff, the ma-
jority solves the dilemma by finding no unreasonable risk of in-
jury. This conclusion is questionable. If a small child were the
"trespasser", would not an unreasonable risk of harm be found?
However, the majority reaches a correct result. Plaintiff was at
fault. Ignoring the fence and sign, she elected to enter an ob-
viously unsafe structure and to walk on some dilapidated steps.
• . . Plaintiff assumed the risk of her injury and is barred from
recovery by her victim fault. 0 "
Justice Watson's analysis is persuasive. It means Entrevia should have
a different outcome under comparative fault. On the hypothesis that the
defendant would have been in violation of a duty to an innocent victim
such as a child, the Entrevia plaintiff lost because of her own fault. Vic-
tim fault should no longer figure into the elements of the case in chief:
it should be treated as a recovery-reduction affirmative defense.
The supreme court in Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Co.2"7 denied
recovery for an electrocution death on the theory that the defendant's
power lines did not present an unreasonable risk of harm. Justice Lem-
mon's opinion for the court viewed the issue as requiring balancing the
respective duties and conduct of the various involved entities, including
the decedent. Justice Lemmon added what amounts to a special
concurrence:
203. Id. at 313-14.
204. See supra note 197:
205. 427 S6. 2d 1146 (La. 1983).
206. Id. at 1151 (Watson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
207. 418 So. 2d 493 (La, 1982).
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As between Gulf States [defendant] and Kent [decedent], the
analysis of the comparative duties and conduct is particularly dif-
ficult in a setting in which the fault of one gives rise to total
liability and the fault of the other totally bars recovery. To make
such an abrupt cut-off, Gulf States' duty (on which its fault is
measured) must be deemed to begin at roughly the same point
where Kent's duty ends, and this solution is neither practical nor
conceptually possible.
Substantial justice can only be accomplished by quantifying the
fault of each party and assigning proportionate responsibility for
the occurrence. Since the Legislature had not yet adopted a com-
parative fault system when this accident occurred, and since this
court has previously been disinclined to recognize this system
judicially, this case must be decided under the recognized defi-
ciencies of an all-or-nothing system.2"8
Justice Lemmon seems to be saying that comparative fault is a great im-
provement because it avoids the necessity of treating victim-fault ques-
tions as part and parcel of determining the defendant's duty. 20 9
At least as viewed by Justices Watson and Lemmon, Entrevia and
Kent are decisions in which victim fault negated liability. Under that view,
the decisions are (pre-comparative fault) applications of the Johnson view.
(For present purposes it is not important whether the no-liability conclu-
sion is stated in terms of breach of duty or scope of protection of duty.
The important distinction is between using the plaintiff's fault as a deter-
minant of one or more of the elements of the case in chief and refusing
to do so.) " ' Such cases should turn out differently in a comparative fault
system. Comparative fault will not work properly unless the courts are
careful not to weave victim-fault considerations into the case in chief.
Justices Watson and Lemmon seem sensitive to this necessity.
To recapitulate: In a comparative fault case, the fault of the victim
should be relevant solely as an affirmative defense. It should not negate
the existence of any element of the case in chief; victim-fault issues should
not be intermingled with defendant-fault issues. If the defendant would
be liable to a fault-free and otherwise identically situated victim, then he
should also be liable to the faulty plaintiff, whose recovery would be
reduced by his percentage of fault. The analysis is workable. The facts
of Oliver v. Aminoil, USA are illustrative. 2  An experienced offshore
welder rested part of his weight on a light fixture which collapsed, and
208. Id. at 500 n.10.
209. See also Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 422 So. 2d 1109, 1113 &
n.7 (La. 1982) (Justice Lemmon writing for the court that comparative fault will avoid
the necessity of inquiring whether the defendant's duty so thoroughly embraces the risk
of the plaintiff's fault that the plaintiff's fault should be forgiven).
210. See supra note 88.
211. 662 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
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the welder fell. He sued the platform owner under Civil Code article 2322.
The court denied liability, concluding both that there was no unreasonable
risk of harm and that the plaintiff was guilty of victim fault. The sug-
gested analysis would not alter the outcome in Oliver; victim fault did
not enter into the court's determination of whether there was an
unreasonable risk of harm. What is needed is a decisional technique to
insure that victim-fault issues do not intermingle with defendant-fault
issues. Perhaps, on facts like Oliver, the following question should be
asked: Would the defendant have been liable to a worker on the floor
below, injured by the falling welder or the falling light fixture? If not,
then the unreasonable risk of harm determination was uncontaminated
by victim-fault considerations and is correct. However, if that innocent
worker would be entitled to a recovery, then the plaintiff should also
be entitled to recover, subject to a substantial reduction because of his
own fault. Any other outcome amounts to retention by judges of the power
to select some instances of victim fault as sufficient to deny recovery,
while leaving other victim fault to the quantification system. I am not
persuaded that judges need to have that power. And if they are to have
it, the criteria for "victim fault as bar" versus "victim fault as diminu-
tion" must be set forth. Intermingling victim-fault issues with defendant-
fault issues-which is the essence of the Johnson view-would virtually
guarantee that the criteria would not be set forth.
VI. TORT INDEMNITY
Traditionally, Louisiana tort law provided that solidarily liable tort-
feasor A is entitled to indemnity from solidarily liable tortfeasor B if "ac-
tual fault" is attributable to B and A is "only technically or construc-
tively at fault for failure or omission to perform some legal duty." 2 2
This test was more easily articulated than consistently applied. The
jurisprudence abounds with seemingly inconsistent applications. Two cases
raising the issue whether a defendant liable under Civil Code article 2317
is entitled to indemnity from a products liability defendant reached seem-
ingly divergent conclusions." 3 One recent decision held that a defendant
liable solely on the basis of article 2317 was entitled to indemnity from
a negligent codefendant." ' But another decision, in which a writ has been
granted, appeared to hold that the article 2317 defendant is not entitled
to indemnity from the negligent codefendant unless the codefendant's
212. Narcise v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 427 So. 2d 1192, 1196 (La. 1983). See also
Appalachian Corp. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539 (1922).
213. Compare Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980) (denying indemnity)
with Carter v. Epsco, Inc., 681 F.2d 1062, 1066 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that indemnity
may lie).
214. See Terra Resources, Inc. v. Lake Charles Dredging & Towing, Inc., 695 F.2d 828,
833 (5th Cir. 1983).
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negligence would qualify as fault of a third person such that article 2317
liability would be defeated. " ' A railroad liable under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act was permitted to seek indemnification from the
manufacturer of the defective equipment that injured the plaintiff. " 6 But
a marine employer liable under the Jones Act was held not to be entitled
to indemnity from a negligent physician who treated the employee. 2 7 A
vicariously liable employer was held to be entitled to indemnity from his
tortfeasor employee. " ' But a defendant vicariously liable for the negligence
of his employee was held not to be entitled to indemnity from a negligent
co-tortfeasor.' 9
Despite the perception that employers do not frequently seek indem-
nity from their errant employee-tortfeasors,"I the vicariously liable
employei's right to indemnity from the negligent employee-tortfeasor was
probably the clearest application of the theory of and test for tort indem-
nity. The recent supreme court decision in Sampay v. Morton Salt Co.,2"
which in an indirect but powerful way suggests that the employer no longer
has any such indemnity right, is therefore highly significant across the
law of tort indemnity.
The holding in Sampay was that, because the negligent employee and
the vicariously liable employer are solidary obligors, the plaintiff can set-
tle with and release the negligent employee while effectively reserving his
right to proceed against the employer. Commentators have recognized that
the Sampay court either overlooked or intended to alter the indemnity
doctrine.2 ' The problem is as follows: The tortfeasor employee is pro-
tected by the release from a contribution or indemnity action. '23 Ordinarily,
215. Dusenbery v. McMoran Exploration Co., 433 So. 2d 268, 275 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ granted, 441 So. 2d 208 (La. 1983).
216. See Narcise v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 427 So. 2d 1192, 1196 (La. 1983).
217. See Joiner v. Diamond M Drilling Co., 688 F.2d 256, 261-62 (5th Cir. 1982). Nar-
cise v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 427 So. 2d 1192 (La. 1983) and Joiner seem inconsistent
in that the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982), is nothing more than an adoption of the
Federal Employer's Liability Act by reference.
218. See Curry v. lberville Parish Sheriff's Office, 405 So. 2d 1387, 1391 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1981), writ denied, 410 So. 2d 1135 (La. 1982); Jinks v. McClure, 344 So. 2d
675, 687 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
219. See Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 365 So. 2d 913, 918 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 375 So. 2d 375, 377 n.1 (La. 1979) (indemnity holding ex-
pressly approved).
220. See Comment, Prescribing Solidarity: Contributing to the Indemnity Dilemma, 41
LA. L. REV. 659, 717 n.361 (1981).
221. 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981).
222. See Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Obligations, 42 LA. L. REV.
388, 394 n.22, 395-96 (1982); Comment, Tilting Against Windmills: A Solidary Rejoinder,
41 LA. L. REV. 1279, 1288, 1294 (1981).
223. Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d 915, 921-22 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
Of course, Sampay could theoretically be reconciled with a continued right of indemnity
on the part of the employer by positing that the tortfeasor employee is no longer protected
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a defendant who has been deprived by a settlement of a contribution or
indemnity right he would otherwise have had against the settling tortfeasor
asserts that right by reducing (contribution) or entirely offsetting (indem-
nity) the plaintiff's recovery.22 ' But if the vicariously liable employer in
the Sampay situation can plead indemnity against the plaintiff and offset
any recovery, the right granted by Sampay is entirely meaningless. Hence,
the Sampay decision makes no sense except as having implicitly overruled
the right of indemnification.
On that view, Sampay has demoted the vicariously liable employer's
indemnity right to one of contribution. Under the pre-comparative fault
law, such contribution could perhaps be achieved on a virile share basis,
i.e., 50-50.225 But the supreme court226 and the commentators227 have sug-
gested that the comparative fault statutes will probably apply to appor-
tion liability among tortfeasors heretofore in indemnity relationships. It
is extremely difficult to see how comparative fault apportionment could
work as between a vicariously liable employer and his negligent employee.
The comparative fault adoption will make the solution to the Sampay
puzzle more difficult.
However, aside from the present confusion as to the status of indem-
nity in the employer-employee (and presumably in other vicarious liabil-
ity) situations, the suggestion that comparative fault principles will apply
to apportion ultimate liabilities between most defendants, regardless of
the previous law on indemnity, is welcome. The adoption of that view
would put Louisiana in line with what appears to be a growing trend
in other states.228 It would also greatly simplify the treatment of most
multiparty cases. For example, in the hypothetical case presented in Part
III,229 adoption of that point of view would mean that A's and B's rights
against one another would depend upon the percentages of fault assigned
to each of those defendants, and no question of indemnity would arise.
by the receipt and release from an indemnity action. That suggestion seems too radical
to take seriously. Surely the last thing the court would want is to leave settling tortfeasors
exposed to indemnity (and, it would probably follow, contribution) actions. In any event,
the receipt and release will virtually always contain "hold harmless" provisions whereby
any indemnity or contribution right asserted against the settling tortfeasor would have to
be met by the settling plaintiff.
224. See Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d 915, 921-22 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
225. Another possibility might be a dollar for dollar credit under LA. CIV. CODE art.
2203.
226. See Narcise v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 427 So. 2d 1192, 1196 n.5 (La. 1983).
227. See Johnson, supra note 222, at 396 n.28; Comment, supra note 220, at 706.
228. C. HEFT & C. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL §§ 4A.160, 4A.190 (rev.
ed. 1983) (suggesting that there is a growing trend to translate former indemnity situations
into comparative apportionment situations, except in the situation in which a vicarious liability
relationship exists between the defendants); see V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
§ 16.9 (Supp. 1981); see also B & B Auto Supply v. Central Freight Lines, 603 S.W.2d
814 (Tex. 1980).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 34-42.
1384 [Vol. 44
WEX MALONE TORTS SYMPOSIUM
Concluding that comparative fault principles adequately take care of
situations that formerly gave rise to indemnity rights would also simplify
resolution of cases in which the plaintiff has settled with and released
one of several tortfeasors. In the hypothetical case presented in Part III,
adoption of this view would mean that neither A nor B could success-
fully assert that the plaintiff's settlement with C deprived the remaining
defendant(s) of an indemnity right that would otherwise have been asser-
table against C, and that, therefore, any judgment recovered by the plain-
tiff against the remaining defendant(s) must be reduced to zero. Instead,
A and B would be entitled to reduce the plaintiff's judgment in an amount
representing the percentage of fault of which C was found guilty.
VII. COMPLEX HYPOTHETICAL RECONSIDERED
Parts IV, V, and VI of this article assert that all forms of victim
and tortfeasor fault should be quantified in strict liability and negligence
cases for purposes of determining the rights and liabilities of all parties
to the litigation. Chief among the arguments is that confusion would other-
wise result in complex multi-party cases. Part III presented a hypothetical
case of that type and listed the open questions involved in its resolution.
I argue for resolving each of those questions in such a way as to yield
the conclusion that the fault of the plaintiff and all three tortfeasors should
be quantified, and the resulting percentages used to determine the defen-
dants' liabilities to plaintiff and the defendants' contribution rights against
each other.
If the open questions are resolved in that way, the hypothetical case
in part III yields the same kind of solution as the "straightforward" case
presented in part II. If the trial judge in the part III case can conclude
in favor of quantification across the board, he can submit the case to






On those findings the plaintiff should have a recovery of $60,000. His
recovery is diminished by his own percentage of fault under Civil Code
article 2323, and by C's percentage of fault under Civil Code article 2103
and the relevant jurisprudence on partial settlements."' The judgment
should provide that A and B are solidarily liable for $20,000, and that
230. This hypothetical assumes that the jury properly found fault and legal cause as
to each actor. See supra note 26.
231. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text & note 28.
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A is individually liable for an additional $40,000. (Under Civil Code arti-
cle 2324, A and B are solidarily liable, but B's share cannot exceed his
percentage of fault since he was less negligent than the plaintiff.) The
judgment should also provide that A has a contribution right, under Civil
Code article 2103, against B up to a ceiling of $20,000 should more than
$40,000 be collected from A.
If the open questions are not resolved in such a way as to permit
the foregoing solution, grave difficulties are in store. For example, sup-
pose the trial judge concluded that the plaintiff's conduct may well con-
stitute assumption of risk; that assumption of risk would be a bar to
recovery against A, the strict liability defendant;2 32 but that the
Baumgartner233 reasoning means that the plaintiff's conduct should not
count against him at all in the case against B, the negligent motorist."'
On those assumptions, the judge would elicit a jury finding as to whether
the plaintiff was guilty of assumption of risk, but there would be no reason
to require the jury to quantify the plaintiff's fault. (On the assumptions
under consideration, plaintiff fault, if found by the jury, would bar
recovery against A but would be wholly forgivable as against B.) On the
other hand, the trial judge might decide not to make up his mind about
the effects of assumed risk until the jury had spoken. If so, he might
submit the case as suggested above, and thereafter have to worry about
what to do with the 30% finding of plaintiff fault.
The trial judge can work with the jury's findings either way. The
important point is that once he determines that quantified plaintiff fault
is not part of the analysis, the judge should thereafter look to the degrees
of fault among the tortfeasors only. If the jury made percentage findings
only as to the tortfeasors, the percentages would be used. But if the jury
in addition made a percentage finding as to the plaintiff, the judge should
ignore that percentage and treat the jury verdict as though the jury had
assigned 10007o of the relevant fault to the three tortfeasors. Take, for
example, the hypothesized jury findings of A's fault at 40%, B's at 20%
and C's at 10%. As among the tortfeasors, the degrees of fault are 4/7
for A, 2/7 for B, and 1/7 for C.235 If not mathematically adjusted in
232. See cases cited supra note 55.
233. See supra note 43.
234. In Dofflemyer v. Gilley, 378 So. 2d 440, 442 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979), rev'd on
other grounds, 384 So. 2d 435 (La. 1980), the court suggested that the Baumgartner princi-
ple would not sweep victim fault amounting to assumption of risk into the scope of protec-
tion of the defendant's duty. But the trial judge in the Part Ill hypothetical could conclude
that the plaintiff's conduct might amount to assumption of risk as against the products
liability defendant, see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text & note 28, while counting
as Baumgartner-forgivable negligence only in the case against the negligent motorist.
235. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act provides for this kind of redistribution of
jury findings. See § 2(d) & commissioners' comment, 12 U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 1979), reprinted
in 40 LA. L. REV. at 427-28. Comparative fault commentators generally agree that such
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this way, the jury percentage findings cannot be used to determine rights
and liabilities without having the effect of attributing the plaintiff's 30%
fault to the plaintiff. On the hypothesis under consideration, the plain-
tiff's 30% fault was not to count against him in the action against one
of the defendants.
Theoretically, at least thirty possible solutions exist for resolution of
the Part III hypothetical.236 Some of the possibilities are less plausible
than others, but all are imaginable. The following presentation sets forth
those possibilities, together with a summary of the arguments that (on
the basis of the indicated assumptions) could be made for each. Each
of the following possible solutions is based upon the hypothetical jury
findings set forth above: damages at $100,000, plaintiff's negligence-30%,
A's negligence-40%, B's negligence-20%, C's negligence- 10%. 237
(1) The plaintiff's fault constituted assumption of risk which bars
recovery against both A and B.
(2) The plaintiff's fault constituted assumption of risk which bars
recovery against A. But the plaintiff's fault should be quantified and only
diminish recovery in the action against B. (The jurisprudence affords some
support for arguing that assumption of risk bars recovery in strict pro-
ducts liability cases,238 and for arguing that assumption of risk is merely
another form of comparative fault in negligence cases.)239
But by what amount should the plaintiff's recovery against B be
diminished? There are at least three possibilities.
(a) B might argue that the plaintiff's recovery should be limited to
$20,000 under Civil Code article 2324, which states that a defendant whose
fault is less than that of the plaintiff is "not . . . liable for more than
the degree of his fault." B would argue that his degree of fault has been
fixed at 20%. (The flaw in this argument is that it entails a functional
imputation of A's 40% fault to the plaintiff.)
(b) The plaintiff might argue for a recovery of $60,000, basing his
argument on Civil Code article 2323, which limits diminution of the plain-
redistribution is appropriate. See Wade, supra note 28, at 310; Chamallas, supra note 9,
at 383, 390. Professor Johnson argues persuasively that the Louisiana comparative fault
statutes clearly contemplate that such redistribution is appropriate. Johnson, supra note 9,
at 337 n.67. But see Varnado v. Continental Ins. Co, 446 So. 2d 1343, 1346 & n.4, assert-
ing that it is not.
236. Probably solutions other than the thirty set forth in the text can be imagined. I
have tried to set forth the ones that have enough plausibility that they can be seriously argued.
My purpose is to show how complex multiparty cases become if fault quantification across
the board is not available. A secondary purpose is to comment on how these cases should
be worked out in the event the law develops to preclude quantification across the board.
237. See supra note 230.
238. See supra note 55.
239. See supra note 234.
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tiff's recovery to his "degree or percentage of negligence" (here 3076),
and Civil Code article 2103 and the partial settlement jurisprudence, 0
which warrant reduction of a further 10% representing the negligence of
C, the settling tortfeasor. (This argument is flawed by imputing A's 40%
fault to B. It probably offends Civil Code article 2324.)
(c) The soundest resolution here would permit a recovery of $33,333.
As the plaintiff is not entitled to recover against A, the finding of A's
percentage of fault is not relevant to the adjustment of damages as be-
tween the plaintiff and B. The relevant fault percentages found by the
jury are plaintiff's 30%, B's 20%, and C's 10%. As among those three
actors, the degrees of fault are thus plaintiff-3/6, B-2/6, and C-1/6. 4'
The plaintiff should have his recovery reduced under Civil Code article
2323 by his own 3/6 degree of fault. Under article 2103 and the partial
settlement jurisprudence, "2 " a further reduction of 1/6 should be made
representing the degree of fault of C, the settling tortfeasor. Civil Code
article 2324 provides further justification for this result; B, whose fault
is less than that of the plaintiff, cannot be responsible for more than
the share of the damages represented by his degree of fault, here 2/6.
(3) The plaintiff's fault constituted assumption of risk that bars
recovery against A. However, the principle of the Baumgartner case "3
means that the plaintiff's fault should be forgiven in the action against B.
Here again, several resolutions are possible.
(a) B might argue that the plaintiff's recovery should be limited to
$28,571. The argument would be that the plaintiff's fault has become ir-
relevant to the determination, being forgiven by Baumgartner, and that
therefore, the relevant fault percentages are A's 40%, B's 20%, and C's
10%. As among these three actors, the degrees of fault are thus A-4/7,
B-2/7, and C-1/7.1" B would argue that he should not pay for A's
or C's share, but only his own 2/7 share. (This argument is flawed in
that, on the assumptions under consideration, the percentage findings as
to both the plaintiff and A have become irrelevant: the plaintiff's, because
forgiven by Baumgartner; A's, because not productive of any liability.
The argument charges the plaintiff, with fault properly attributable to A.)
(b) B might argue that recovery should be limited to $50,000. This
240. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text & note 28.
241. The percentages found by the jury-plaintiff, 30%, B, 20%, C, 10%-translate
into 3/6, 2/6, and 1/6, respectively, to maintain proportionality among these three entities.
By simple mathematics, the "missing" 40% fault attributed to A is redistributed propor-
tionately among the other three actors. As indicated in the text, failure to make this calculation
would have the effect of imputing A's 40% fault to the plaintiff or to B. See supra note
235 (supporting the appropriateness of such redistribution of jury-found percentages).
242. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text & note 28.
243. See supra note 43.
244. See supra note 241.
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argument would rest on the percentages found by the jury, and B would
contend that he should pay for only his own 20% share and the plain-
tiff's (Baumgartner-forgiven) 30% share, not for the shares of A and C.
(But this argument has the effect of charging the plaintiff with part of
the fault properly attributable to A.)
(c) The plaintiff might argue for a recovery of $90,000. This argu-
ment would rest on the percentages found by the jury, and would con-
tend that the only permissible reduction is the 10% representing the degree
of fault of C, the settling tortfeasor. (The flaw in this argument is that
it effectively charges B with all of A's fault.)
(d) The plaintiff might argue for a recovery of $85,714. This argu-
ment would assert that the plaintiff's fault, being forgiven, is irrelevant
to the determination, and that the relevant percentages of fault found
by the jury are A's 40%, B's 20%, and C's 10%0. As among those three
actors, the degrees of fault are thus A-4/7, B-2/7, and C-/7. 4 The
plaintiff would argue that recovery should be diminished only by the 1/7
share of C, the settling tortfeasor. (But this argument is also flawed. The
percentage findings against both the plaintiff and A are irrelevant on the
assumptions under consideration. The argument charges B with fault prop-
erly attributable to A.)
(e) The soundest resolution here would yield a recovery of $66,667.
Neither the plaintiff's percentage of fault nor A's percentage of fault is
relevant to the adjustment as between the plaintiff and B. (On the assump-
tions under consideration, the plaintiff's fault is not relevant because
Baumgartner has forgiven it; A's fault is not relevant because A is not
subject to any liability.) The relevant fault percentages are B's 20% and
C's 10%. B's and C's degrees of fault are thus 2/3 and 1/3, respectively. '"
B should owe the plaintiff's full damages less a reduction representing
C's degree of fault to account for the partial settlement.
(4) The plaintiffs fault should be quantified so as to diminish recovery
against A. However, that fault constituted assumption of risk constituting
a bar to recovery in the action against B. (This is not a particularly plausi-
ble combination; it is included in the interest of a complete account of
the comparative fault possibilities.)
Once again, several arguments as to the amount of the reduction are
possible.
(a) A might argue that recovery should be limited to $40,000. This
argument would rest on the percentages found by the jury, and A would
assert that he can not be held liable for the negligence of the plaintiff,





(b) The plaintiff might argue for a recovery of $60,000. This argu-
ment would rest on the percentages found by the jury, and would assert
that recovery should be diminished only by the plaintiff's 30% share and
C's 10% share. (The flaw is that A is being charged with all of B's fault.)
(c) The best resolution here would limit recovery to $50,000. B's
percentage of fault has become irrelevant, since B is not liable to the
plaintiff. The relevant fault percentages are plaintiff's 30%, A's 40%,
and C's 10%. The degrees of fault as among those actors are thus
plaintiff-3/8, A-4/8, and C-1/8.4 7 Damages should be reduced by
the plaintiff's own 3/8 fault and C's 1/8 fault.
(5) The plaintiff's fault should be quantified so as to diminish recovery
against both A and B. (This is the preferred solution, comparative fault
across the board, set forth in the text above.)"'
(6) The plaintiff's fault should be quantified so as to diminish recovery
against A; under Baumgartner, it should be forgiven in the action against
B. (I believe this is the outcome that would be produced by application
of the Johnson view to these facts).24 9
The possible arguments for how the diminution should be achieved
include the following.
(a) The plaintiff might argue for a recovery of $90,000. This argu-
ment would rest on the percentages found by the jury, and would assert
that B is liable for the full damages less a reduction of 10% representing
the degree of fault of C, the settling tortfeasor. Presumably the argument
would continue that A should be solidarily liable with B up to $60,000
(full damages less the plaintiff's 30% and C's 10%). Under this argu-
ment, the contribution shares of A and B would presumably be $40,000
and $50,000, respectively. 5 0 (Assuming full solvency, i.e., that A and B
ultimately paid according to their contribution shares, this argument would
have B charged with $10,000 attributable to A's fault. But if the con-
tribution shares were adjusted to alleviate that consequence, A would then
bear more of the damages than are attributable to his fault.)
(b) The plaintiff might argue for a recovery of $87,500, asserting that
B's percentage of fault has become irrelevant under the Baumgartner
holding and that B is not entitled to a comparative fault reduction. Hence,
247. Id.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 230-32.
249. Johnson argues for the continued applicability of Baumgartner. See Johnson, supra
note 9, at 330-33. 1 do not think he opposes comparative fault application in strict liability
cases, although he does suggest that Civil Code article 2323 is worded so as to suggest
that strict liability cases may not be covered. Id. at 339 n.70.
250. A's fault (400o) is twice as great as B's (20%), but on the assumptions under con-
sideration A is entitled to a reduction for the plaintiff's fault, whereas B is not. Therefore,
perhaps A's ultimate exposure should be confined to his 40°0 share of the jury-found fault.
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in the action against B, the relevant percentages of fault are plaintiff's
30%, A's 40%, and C's 10%. The degrees of fault among those three
actors are thus plaintiff-3/8, A-4/8, and C-1/8.51 The plaintiff would
argue that his recovery against B should be diminished only by C's 1/8
share. Presumably the argument would continue that A's liability should
be figured on the basis of the percentages found by the jury, and therefore,
A should be solidarily liable with B up to $60,000 (full damages less plain-
tiff's 30% and C's 10%). Working out the contribution shares of A and
B under this argument seems unbearably tricky. Perhaps A's contribution
share should be $50,000-his percentage share of the loss-and B's,
$47,500. After all, B is the one who by hypothesis is being assessed under
the more stringent Baumgartner duty."' (This argument is flawed since
it charges B with part of A's fault.)
(c) The plaintiff might argue for a recovery of $85,714. He would
assert that, in the action against B, the plaintiff's percentage of fault has
been rendered irrelevant by Baumgartner, and the relevant percentages
of fault are therefore A's 40%, B's 20%, and C's 10%. The degrees of
fault as among those three actors are A-4/7, B-2/7, and C-1/7. '"
The plaintiff would argue that his recovery against B should be diminished
only by C's 1/7 share. The argument would continue that A's liability
should be figured on the basis of the percentages found by the jury, and
therefore, A should be solidarily liable with B up to $60,000 (full damages
less plaintiff's 30% and C's 10076). Once again, contribution shares under
this argument are anybody's guess. Perhaps A's contribution share should
be limited to $40,000, as in the foregoing example. (In whatever way the
contribution shares are worked out, this argument erroneously ignores the
wrong party's percentage of fault. In the action against B on the assump-
tions under consideration, the percentage finding against the plaintiff,
rather than against B, is what seems most irrelevant.)
(d) Perhaps the best resolution here would conclude that in the ac-
tion against B, the relevant degrees of fault are B's 20% and C's 10%.
As between those two actors, the relative degrees of fault are thus B-2/3,
and C-1/3.14 Therefore, the plaintiff's recovery against B should be
limited to $66,667. In the action against A, the relevant degrees of fault
are plaintiff's 30%, A's 400, and C's 10%. As among those three ac-
tors, the relative degrees of fault are thus plaintiff-3/8, B-4/8, and
C-1/8.1" Therefore, the plaintiff's recovery against A should be limited
to $50,000. But the recoveries against A and B cannot be cumulative.
Seemingly, the judgment should provide that A and B are solidarily liable
251. See supra note 241.
252. See supra notes 43 and 249.





for $50,000 and that B is individually liable for an additional $16,667.
Perhaps (because I cannot come up with a more plausible suggestion) A's
and B's contribution shares should be equal, i.e., $33,333.50 each. While
A's fault is twice as great as B's, on the assumptions under consideration
A is entitled to a reduction for plaintiff fault and B is not.
(7) The plaintiff's fault constituted "contributory negligence" which
is not a defense to strict liability actions, so it does not count against
A. As against B, however, the plaintiff's fault amounts to assumption
of the risk which bars recovery. (Again, this is a fairly implausible com-
bination of assumptions, and is included only for the sake of a complete
picture of the analytical possibilities.)
The possibilities for resolving the complex hypothetical on these
assumptions include the following.
(a) The plaintiff might argue for a recovery of $90,000. The argu-
ment would rest on the percentages found by the jury, and would assert
that the plaintiff's recovery against A should be reduced only by the 10076
fault found against C, the settling tortfeasor. (But A is being charged
for all of B's fault.)
(b) A might argue for a recovery of $70,000, asserting that the plain-
tiff's recovery against A should represent the combination of A's 40076
fault and the plaintiff's (forgiven as to A) 30% fault. (But the plaintiff
is being charged for all of B's fault.)
(c) A might argue for a recovery of $66,667. This argument would
assert that quantification of the fault of strict liability defendants is inap-
propriate, and therefore, A's liability should be predicated on the pre-
comparative fault jurisprudence that would account for the settlement with
C by a 1/3 reduction representing C's virile share of the obligation. (But
plaintiff is being charged for most of B's fault.)
(d) By a similar argument, a recovery of $50,000 might result. This
argument would agree that strict liability fault should not be quantified,
but would assert that B, having escaped liability, is totally out of the
picture, and therefore, the relevant virile shares are A's 1/2 and C's 1/3.
(Again, the plaintiff is being charged with most of B's fault.)
(e) A similar argument by A could conceivably yield a recovery of
only $33,333. This argument would assert that strict liability fault cannot
be quantified and that plaintiff is entitled to recovery less the 1/3 virile
shares of B and C, respectively. (But the plaintiff is being charged for
all of B's fault and some of A's or his own.)
(f) Probably the best resolution here would yield a recovery of $80,000.
On the assumptions under consideration, the percentage findings against
the plaintiff and B are irrelevant: plaintiff's fault is forgiven, and B is
not liable at all. The relevant fault percentages are A's 40076 and C's 10%;
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the relative degrees of fault are A-4/5, and C-1/5.2 56 The plaintiff's
recovery should be diminished only by C's degree of fault.
(8) The plaintiff's fault constituted "contributory negligence" which
is not a defense to strict products liability actions. The plaintiff's fault,
however, is quantifiable comparative negligence in the action against B.
(The supreme court could conceivably decide Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast2"'
in such a way as to leave Louisiana law in this posture.)
The possible resolutions under these assumptions include the following.
(a) The plaintiff might argue for a recovery of $90,000. This argu-
ment would rest on the percentages found by the jury, and would assert
that, in the action against A, recovery can be reduced only by the 10%0
representing the fault of C, the settling tortfeasor. Presumably the argu-
ment would continue that B should be solidarily liable with A up to
$20,000. Under this argument the contribution shares of A and B would
be $70,000 and $20,000, respectively.258 (This argument results in charg-
ing A with all of B's fault.)
(b) The plaintiff might argue for a recovery of $85,714, asserting that
in the action against A, the plaintiff's percentage of fault has become
irrelevant since A is not entitled to a comparative fault reduction.
Therefore, the relevant fault percentages would be A's 40%, B's 20%,
and C's 10%, and the degrees of fault as among those three actors are
A-4/7, B-2/7, and C-1/7.1" The plaintiff would argue that his
recovery against A should be reduced only by the degree of fault found
against C, the settling tortfeasor (1/7). The argument would presumably
continue that B's liability should be [based on] the percentages found
by the jury, and therefore, B should be solidarily liable with A up to
$20,000. B's contribution share would also be $20,000 under this
argument. 2 1 (This argument charges A with most of B's fault.)
(c) A might argue that recovery should be limited to $50,000. This
argument would assert that A's percentage of fault is irrelevant, either
because no comparative-fault reduction is available to A, or because the
fault of strictly liable defendants should not be quantified. Therefore, the
relevant percentages of fault would be plaintiff's 30%, B's 20%, and C's
10%, and the degrees of fault as among those three actors are
plaintiff-3/6, B-2/6, and C-1/6.16' A would argue that its liability
256. Id.
257. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
258. B, whose fault is less than the plaintiff's on the assumptions under consideration,
cannot be liable for more than the share of the damages represented by B's degree of fault.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2324.
259. See supra note 241.
260. See supra note 258.
261. See supra note 241.
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should not include the 3/6 share of the accident attributed to B and C.
Presumably this argument would entail the conclusion that B is solidarily
liable with A up to $33,333 (B's 2/6 share of the accident), and that B's
contribution share is $33,333.16 (This argument charges the plaintiff with
B's fault.)
(d) Probably the best resolution here would conclude that, in the ac-
tion against A, the relevant fault percentages are A's 40% and C's 1007o.
A's and C's degrees of fault are thus 4/5 and 1/5, respectively.2 6 3 A should
be liable to the plaintiff for $80,000 (full damages less the 1/5 share
representing the fault of C, the settling tortfeasor). In the action against
B, the relevant fault percentages are plaintiff's 30076, B's 2001o, and C's
100o. As among those actors, the respective degrees of fault are thus
plaintiff-3/6, B-2/6, and C-1/6.16 The plaintiff's recovery against B
would thus be limited to $33,333. But the recoveries against A and B
cannot be cumulative. The judgment should provide that A and B are
solidarily liable to the plaintiff for $33,333, and that A is individually
liable for an additional $46,667. A's and B's contribution shares would
also be $46,667 and $33,333, respectively.
(9) The plaintiff's fault does not count in the action against A because
"contributory negligence" is not a defense to strict products liability ac-
tions. It does not count in the action against B because of Baumgartner.
(This is another solution permitted or favored by the Johnson view.)
On these assumptions, the possibilities for solving the complex
hypothetical include the following.
(a) The plaintiff might argue for a recovery of $90,000. This argu-
ment would rest on the percentages found by the jury, and would con-
tend that the only permissible reduction in recovery is the 10% represent-
ing the fault of C, the settling tortfeasor. Presumably, the plaintiff would
assert that A and B are solidarily liable for the entire $90,000. Under
this argument, the contribution shares of A and B would probably be
$60,000 and $30,000, respectively.265 (This argument charges A and B with
some of C's fault.)
(b) The defendants might argue for limiting recovery to $66,667. The
basis for this argument would be the assertion that, as neither defendant
is entitled to a reduction on the basis of the plaintiff's fault, comparative
fault has become irrelevant in the case. (The defendants might also assert
that the fault of a strictly liable defendant cannot be quantified in any
meaningful way.) The argument would continue by asserting that reduc-
tion of the plaintiff's recovery to reflect the settlement with C, the non-
262. See supra note 258.
263. See supra note 241.
264. Id.
265. A is twice as faulty as B, and neither is entitled to a reduction for the plaintiff's fault.
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party tortfeasor, should be in the amount of 1/3, representing C's virile
share. Under this argument, A and B would be solidarily liable for the
$66,667, and their contribution shares would be $33,333 each. (This argu-
ment charges the plaintiff with some of the fault of A, B, and C.)
(c) Probably the best resolution here would yield a recovery of $85,714.
On the assumptions under consideration, the plaintiff's fault has been
rendered irrelevant. The relevant fault percentages are therefore A's 40%,
B's 20%, and C's 10%. The degrees of fault as among the three tort-
feasors are thus A-4/7, B-2/7, and C-1/7.16 The plaintiff should
recover his full damages less a 1/7 reduction representing the fault of
C, the settling tortfeasor. Presumably the argument would assert that A
and B are solidarily liable for the entire $85,714. Under this argument,
the contribution shares of A and B would probably be $57,143 and
$28,571, respectively. (A is twice as "faulty" as B.)
CONCLUSION
Part II of this article demonstrates the relative ease and rationality
of operation of comparative fault principles in a case presenting no doc-
trinal obstacle to quantification of the fault of all relevant actors. Parts
III and VII show the unsuitable complexity created by doctrines that would
preclude such across-the-board quantification. Parts IV through VI argue
that courts can and should avoid adopting or resurrecting such doctrines
in comparative fault cases. At bottom, the argument is that trusting the
trier of fact to achieve principled and equitable fault quantification is the
essential premise of any comparative fault adoption. Principles, doctrines,
and modes of analysis that stray very far from that philosophy will
ultimately prove destructive to the comparative fault system.
266. See supra note 241.
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